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When a disaster occurs during a conflict, the security concerns and need for 
humanitarian aid can increase; survivors need both, but often the government needs to 
choose which takes precedence, and humanitarian aid can fall by the wayside. This thesis 
examines the impacts of political and military hindrances in conflicts between armed 
groups and governments on the Red Cross Movement’s humanitarian aid delivery during 
disaster response following the declaration of the war on terror. This thesis is in two 
parts. The first part establishes the environment in which the Red Cross Movement 
operates and the attitude toward humanitarian aid in conflict. The second part analyzes 
the disaster response in three cases, along with the security issues that led to restrictive 
environments for humanitarian aid and underserved populations. In addition, this thesis 
includes two historical case studies to provide a comparison between response before and 
after the war on terror. 
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When a disaster occurs during a conflict, the security concerns and need for 
humanitarian aid can increase; survivors need both, but often the government needs to 
choose which takes precedence and humanitarian aid can fall by the wayside. In the 
aftermath of a natural disaster, populations are displaced and additional burdens are 
placed on affected governments to aid the survivors—even those who are considered 
enemies of the state. When a disaster occurs in the midst of a conflict, it can significantly 
impact governments’ and armed groups’ abilities to defend and fight.  
Natural disasters are non-discriminatory forces that can lead to a scarcity of 
resources through massive loss of life, depletion of food and water, and destruction of 
transportation routes. Often survivors, who have already suffered from the conflict, 
participated in the conflict, or live in areas controlled by armed groups, may find 
themselves in more vulnerable positions and perhaps stay in the same shelters or camps. 
At the same time, humanitarian aid workers who are trying to provide impartial and 
neutral assistance are often caught in between the government and armed groups. The 
Red Cross Movement has cited counterterrorism laws and the increased use of the 
military as recent additional issues that are detrimental to the provision of aid because 
they create an illusion of a unified front that includes non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in the fight against terrorism. These issues lead to uneven provision of aid, which 
goes against the Red Cross Movement’s code of conduct that aid will be provided in a 
neutral, independent, and impartial manner. 
The responses to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and 
the 2010 Pakistan flood illustrate the issues that arise for the Red Cross Movement and 
governments during a disaster response in a conflict situation. In these situations, there 
was an increase in restrictions on resources and the provision of aid due to security 
concerns. The cases show that counterterrorism laws and increased use of the military to 
provide humanitarian aid to fight terrorism may have exacerbated the negative perception 
of NGOs, eroding their ability to negotiate and navigate the situation; however, these are 
not the only factors that contribute to resource restrictions and hindrance of aid. Similar 
 xii 
situations in Nigeria (1968) and Afghanistan (1998) show that the restriction of resources 
and provision of aid present in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan existed prior to the war 
on terror.  
Political objectives to maintain security are the main focus during both conflict 
and disasters in conflict. The government is responsible for the response to a disaster but 
must maintain security operations in the chaos. A 2012 message from the United Nations 
Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance regarding humanitarian access lists 
the following barriers to the provision of humanitarian aid that can occur during conflicts, 
and notes that they may exist in disasters:  
• bureaucratic restrictions on personnel and humanitarian supplies 
• impediments related to climate, terrain or lack of infrastructure 
• the diversion of aid, and interference in the delivery of relief and 
implementation of activities 
• active fighting and military operations 
• attacks on humanitarian personnel, goods, and facilities1 
The five cases—Nigeria, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan—show 
all these barriers are present during the disaster response. The more recent cases also 
show four additional factors that are present in conflict/disaster situations that can cause 
increased security concerns and resource restrictions: 
• multiple NGOs crowding the response 
• negative perception of humanitarian aid 
• increase of internally displaced persons in camps that existed due to the 
conflict 
• impacted areas are not under state control  
These four additional factors put stress on states and can significantly hinder disaster 
response operations. The Red Cross Movement’s relationships with governments and 
                                                 
1 “OCHA on Message: Humanitarian Access,” March 2012, 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/120312_OOM-humanitarianAccess_eng.pdf. 
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armed groups facilitate its response, but all of these factors can still result in the uneven 
provision of aid, regardless of best attempts to avoid them. 
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In the aftermath of a natural disaster, populations are displaced and additional 
burdens are placed on affected governments to aid the survivors—even those who are 
considered enemies of the state. When a disaster occurs in the midst of a conflict, it can 
significantly impact governments’ and armed groups’ abilities to defend and fight. 
Natural disasters are non-discriminatory forces that can lead to a scarcity of resources 
through massive loss of life, depletion of food and water, and destruction of 
transportation routes. Often survivors, who have already suffered from or participated in 
the conflict, or who live in areas controlled by armed groups, may find themselves in 
more vulnerable positions and perhaps stay in the same shelters or camps. At the same 
time, humanitarian aid workers who are trying to provide impartial and neutral assistance 
are caught in between the government and armed groups. 
The government must grapple with the dilemma of not just protecting its people 
against the armed groups, but also determining priorities for rebuilding and restoring the 
impacted areas and determining if aid should, or can, be provided to areas populated or 
held by armed groups. Should the government abstain from providing aid to those areas 
and capitalize on the vulnerability to eradicate the threat, or should it allow for the 
delivery of water and food to keep the survivors alive to fight another day? What about 
the non-combatant survivors in the area caught in the middle? 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The situation described in the previous paragraphs is considered a complex 
emergency. A complex emergency is “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or 
society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal 
or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the 
mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing [United Nations] country 
program.”1 
                                                 
1 “Complex/Manmade Hazards: Complex Emergencies,” International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies, accessed February 21, 2017. http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-
management/about-disasters/definition-of-hazard/complex-emergencies/. 
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The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
lists the following characteristics of a complex emergency: 
• extensive violence and loss of life 
• displacements of populations 
• widespread damage to societies and economies 
• the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance 
• the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and 
military constraints 
• significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas2 
This thesis focuses on the political and military hindrances in complex emergencies and 
their impacts on the Red Cross Movement’s disaster response during conflicts.  
Governments’ recent actions to curb security risks for their countries have 
focused on cutting off financing and material support to terrorist organizations through 
counterterrorism laws, as well as military operations that include security operations and 
humanitarian aid. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have argued that 
counterterrorism laws and increased use of the military for humanitarian aid missions 
result in increased operational complexities that compromise their ability to provide aid. 
In the United Nations (UN) Office of Humanitarian Assistance’s list of barriers to 
humanitarian access in conflicts, counterterrorism laws are described as bureaucratic 
restrictions. Increased military humanitarian aid has blurred the lines between NGOs and 
the military. However, attributing these mechanisms as the sole cause of recent issues 
(e.g., increased attacks on NGOs by armed groups and decreased access to certain areas) 
fails to recognize the tensions that have always existed between political/military 
objectives and providing impartial, neutral, and independent aid in a conflict.  
First of all, the provision of aid has always been dependent on the willingness of 
the government and the armed groups, and the Red Cross Movement’s capability to 
navigate the situation. Article 71 of the Geneva Conventions First Additional Protocol 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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notes that NGO personnel “shall be subject to the approval of the Party in whose territory 
they will carry out their duties” and cannot “exceed the terms of their mission under this 
Protocol.”3 Disasters and conflicts, individually, can have political and security 
ramifications; governments are judged on their response by the international community 
and the response efforts can lead to tension between humanitarian aid agencies and the 
government. From the government perspective, humanitarian aid is an aspect of the 
response, and the objective is to make sure the aid gets to survivors—which can come 
with a bias in the distribution of the aid. From the NGO perspective, everyone should get 
unbiased aid with a focus on the most vulnerable and without political or military 
direction. The two different perspectives cause tension during a conflict.  
The tensions between humanitarian aid and political and military objectives that 
exist during a conflict are compounded in the chaos of disaster response. The disaster can 
cause political and military issues—such as in Indonesia, where local government 
officials were killed in the disaster, or in Sri Lanka, where aid to the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) caused political strife.4 Disasters provide a chance to exercise “soft 
power” counterinsurgency efforts. The provision of aid to soften the negative perception 
of a country was cited as a reason for U.S. Navy operations in Indonesia.5 Disasters can 
cause unexpected and unplanned-for security risks that can be exploited by armed groups 
to make the government appear weak. The international community had concerns that the 
Pakistani government could not handle the response to the 2010 floods.6 Poor response, it 
was believed, would have been a setback to the stabilization efforts supported by the 
United States.7 This causes more, sometimes erratic, restrictions on humanitarian aid that 
                                                 
3 David Fisher, “Domestic Regulation of International Humanitarian Relief in Disasters and Armed 
Conflict: A Comparative Analysis,” International Review of the Red Cross 89, no. 866 (June 2007): 366. 
4 Sharon Wiharta et al., The Effectiveness of Foreign Military Assets in Natural Disaster Response 
(Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2008); Jon Bennett et al., Coordination 
of International Humanitarian Assistance in Tsunami-Affected Countries-Evaluation Findings for 
Indonesia (London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, 2006): 37. 
5 Rhoda Margesson, Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief 
Operations (CRS Report NO. RL32715) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005). 
6 K. Alan Kronstadt, Pervaze A. Sheikh, and Bruce Vaughn, Flooding in Pakistan: Overview and 
Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. R41424) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service). 
7 Ibid. 
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leaves the Red Cross Movement unable to navigate the situation and provide aid to the 
most vulnerable.  
Furthermore, the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and international 
humanitarian law (IHL)—longstanding frameworks drafted to address these tensions and 
give the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) its authorities—has 
diminished due to changes in the conflict environment. The ICRC conducts independent 
assessments of a situation to determine how a conflict should be classified; the state 
should take this assessment into account under a Geneva Convention mandate.8 
However, since the 1990s, there have been changes to the definition of conflict; states 
show reluctance to accept these changes and a lack of political will to adhere to IHL, 
calling the framework into question. Humanitarian aid resources (workers, relief supplies, 
and funding) used in the conflict- and disaster-impacted areas are subjected to stricter 
laws and regulations due to security issues.9 This is a violation of the Geneva 
Conventions and IHL during conflicts, as defined in the frameworks.10 If a situation is 
considered a law enforcement operation by the state, the Red Cross Movement can only 
mitigate the situation through negotiation.   
The mix of counterterrorism laws, increased use of military humanitarian aid 
efforts, and lack of political will to adhere to IHL are new hindrances that exacerbate the 
tension between governments and the Red Cross Movement. This creates a wicked 
problem: how to provide aid during a disaster in an unsecure situation. The government’s 
restrictions on efforts by the Red Cross Movement to maintain security lead to 
underserved populations of the most vulnerable. This violates the Red Cross Movement’s 
principles and makes for an untenable situation that erodes the perception of the NGOs’ 
work and hinders their ability to negotiate with all parties to provide aid. 
                                                 
8 Kathleen Lawland, interview by International Committee of the Red Cross, October 12, 2012, “What 
Is a Non-international Armed Conflict?,” https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/ 
2012/12-10-niac-non-international-armed-conflict.htm. 
9 Fisher, “Domestic Regulation,” 354. 
10 Ibid. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research seeks to answer the following question: How does conflict between 
governments and armed groups affect humanitarian aid delivery in response to natural 
disasters?  
This research question leads to many ancillary questions that are explored in this 
thesis. The ancillary questions include, but are not limited to, the following: 
• Are the principles of neutrality, independence, and impartiality achievable 
for the Red Cross Movement as a whole under these conditions? 
• Are political and military objectives in conflict the same during a disaster? 
• What aspects of the conflict would impact humanitarian aid delivery 
during a disaster? 
• Are conflict response and disaster response treated differently? 
• How does humanitarian aid impact the conflict? 
This thesis argues that, while there have been new challenges, there is an 
inherently insurmountable gap between political/military objectives and humanitarian aid 
in a conflict that extends into disaster response, causing an exacerbated bias and 
corruption in the provision of aid. Response to a conflict and response to a disaster are 
seen as different situations. The ICRC argues that when a disaster happens during a 
conflict, the disaster response should be seen as a part of the conflict response. The 
confusion of the conflict translates into the confusion of the disaster response, but 
political objectives do not change; the objective is still to maintain security and sustain 
the state.   
Despite numerous attempts to manage and define boundaries between political, 
military, and NGO actors, there will always be compromises. The government has the 
sovereign right to secure its country as it sees fit. Security measures used in the conflict 
must be adjusted, and often tightened, due to the chaos a disaster causes to ensure 
continued safety for survivors. Impartial aid in conflicts as well as disasters not only 
keeps civilian survivors alive with food, water, and medical aid, but also allows those 
within the terrorist organization to continue fighting. As a transnational issue, the fight 
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against terrorism has opened up a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) between 
governments and internationally recognized terrorist groups dealing with international 
concerns about how to handle the situation. It is beneficial for the impacted country to 
call on those that have the same objectives (country stability and destruction of terrorist 
organizations) for aid, rather than relying on NGOs that call for unbiased aid. This leaves 
the Red Cross Movement to provide aid within its principles according to the situation as 
it stands rather than the ideal. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses field research data for inductive theory construction in line with 
Erving Goffman’s approach.11 It uses observations of those in the field during disaster 
response in conflict areas to determine if security decisions have obstructed humanitarian 
aid delivery efforts. The thesis uses multi-explanatory case studies as defined by Robert 
Yin in Case Study Research: Design and Methods.12 The case studies are organized as a 
structured, focused comparison. The criteria for the case studies are described in the 
following sections. 
1. NGO Selection 
While many NGOs respond to disasters, this thesis focuses on the Red Cross 
Movement, comprising the ICRC and IFRC. The Red Cross Movement was chosen due 
to the system of quasi-governmental societies that reside in 189 countries and the ICRC’s 
relationships with governments and armed groups. The ICRC has established agreements 
with states that grant it legal status as an “international legal personality.” This allows the 
ICRC to assert legal rights and “shoulder legal responsibilities.” This status is normally 
given to states or state organizations (e.g., the Organization of American States) and is 
not provided to any other NGO.13 This also protects ICRC staff from being legally 
compelled to testify or provide information to governments. This status is only allotted to 
                                                 
11 About.com, s.v. “Constructing an Inductive Theory,” accessed January 26, 2016, 
http://sociology.about.com/od/Research/a/Inductive-Theory-Construction.htm. 
12 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013). 
13 Gabor Rona, “The ICRC Privilege not to Testify: Confidentiality in Action,” ICRC, February 28, 
2004, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/5wsd9q.htm. 
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the ICRC; the Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) Societies are not protected under this 
status. The legal status is established in legislative treaties, agreements, and judicial 
decisions.14 The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia cited and 
recognized the ICRC’s right to decline to testify on criminal actions its workers may have 
witnessed during the Balkan Wars.15 The ICRC was granted observer status by the UN 
General Assembly. 
The ICRC, as the custodian of the Geneva Conventions, promotes governments’ 
and armed groups’ adherence to IHL and serves as the leading entity in conflict-related 
response operations.16 The ICRC reported that, in 2013, it was involved in operations and 
engagement with 200 armed groups in 50 countries to encourage those groups to follow 
IHL.17 The IFRC provides disaster response in conjunction with the RCRC Societies, but 
also provides development programs that primarily focus on medical issues, such as 
reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.  
The RCRC Societies’ relationships with their respective governments vary from 
receiving funding to conducting joint operations for domestic response efforts. This 
connection leaves the societies vulnerable to political objectives, reducing their ability to 
provide humanitarian aid. Out of the 195 independent states in the world, 190 have an 
RCRC Society.18 RCRC Societies make up the International Federation of the Red Cross 
(IFRC) and support their home governments by acting as independent auxiliaries in 
disaster response. For example, the American Red Cross is a co-lead with the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency in providing mass care services during the response to 
                                                 
14 Gabor Rona, “The ICRC’s Status: In a Class of its Own,” International Committee of the Red Cross, 
February 17, 2004, https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5w9fjy.htm. 
15 Ibid. 
16 “International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement: At a Glance,” IFRC, 
November 2007, http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Publications/general/at_a_glance-en.pdf. 
17 “Paul Reuter Prize Award Conference on Contemporary Challenges of Non-International Armed 
Conflicts,” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), December 12, 2013, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/feature/2013/12-12-paul-reuter-prize-award-
conference.htm.  
18 “Independent States of the World,” Bureau of Intelligence and Research, accessed January 17, 2016, 
Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm. 
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domestic disasters, to include a memorandum of understanding allowing the government 
to reimburse the American Red Cross. 
The three entities (ICRC, IFRC, and RCRC Societies) maintain relationships with 
governments in some capacity. The RCRC Societies are auxiliaries of their home 
governments during disaster response but maintain their independence to conduct 
operations. The ICRC simultaneously negotiates with armed groups that are in opposition 
to the government to gain access to populations living in occupied areas, while working 
with governments to coordinate response operations. The RCRC Societies’ quasi-
governmental status and the ICRC’s work with armed groups make these entities unique 
among NGOs; they have access to governments and areas that other NGOs may not be 
able to reach. This duality also allows the Red Cross Movement to maintain neutrality 
and impartiality as a whole by providing, or attempting to provide, humanitarian aid to all 
survivors. 
2. Case Selection 
Utilizing three complex emergency case studies, this thesis analyzes the disaster 
response and security issues (i.e., government exclusion, counterterrorism laws) that led 
to restrictive environments for humanitarian aid and underserved populations. The cases 
highlight different political situations (i.e., government support of humanitarian aid, non-
government support, and areas where the government is unable to provide assistance). 
These case studies also demonstrate how counterterrorism laws, financial regulations, and 
other countries’ military objectives impact humanitarian aid delivery. 
The following factors were used to identify the complex emergencies: 
• multiple RCRC Societies and ICRC involved in the response 
• multinational governmental involvement  
• significant security issues involved 
• groups designated as threats  
• U.S. interest in the country 
• military involvement 
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• groups with reach outside of home country 
• humanitarian aid used strategically (good or bad) 
Based on these criteria, the cases for this thesis are the responses to the 2004 Indonesia 
tsunami response, the 2004 Sri Lanka response to the same tsunami, and the 
2010 Pakistan Flood Response. These three responses represent a wide span of time to 
illuminate humanitarian aid issues before the advent of the 2001 Global War on Terror, 
three years afterward, and nine years after the implementation of counterterrorism laws. 
3. Data Sources 
The data sources used for this research are varied and include many of the typical 
sources. While many sources on this topic are from the ‘90s, they nevertheless seem to 
remain relevant. These sources are: 
• historical data 
• surveys conducted and published by the ICRC on its public website 
• government reports 
• newspaper articles 
• journals 
• books 
• policies, regulations, and laws 
• UN reports 
4. Limitations 
This thesis is limited to the operational complexities of the cases and cannot 
address all issues that arise during disaster response in counterterrorism conflict 
situations. This thesis focuses on operations conducted by the impacted government, 
military, armed groups, and Red Cross Movement to the extent possible. Since the 
responses involved many NGOs, there may be gaps in information or identified security 
issues that did not affect the Red Cross Movement. Since the ICRC has established 
relationships with armed groups and governments, it can negotiate access to areas that 
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other NGOs are not able to, leading to a different experience than other NGOs. The Red 
Cross Movement, however, typically plays a large role in disaster response as the lead 
coordinator of NGOs for the UN, giving the group a situational awareness of security 
situations. 
5. Outcome 
Through a comparison of Red Cross Movement disaster response before and after 
the advent of the war on terror, this thesis produces an analysis that describes how the 
evolving international security environment has affected humanitarian aid delivery in 
complex emergencies involving a response to natural disasters.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review accounts for the current discussions regarding security 
issues and humanitarian aid.  
1. Discussion of Counterterrorism Laws 
This section of the literature review discusses arguments regarding the impact of 
counterterrorism laws on NGOs.  
The article “Humanitarian Engagement under Counter-Terrorism: A Conflict of 
Norms and the Emerging Policy Landscape” discusses recent legal changes that restrict 
material support, resources, and expert advice or assistance to terrorists and foreign 
terrorist groups, and how the changes impact humanitarian aid delivery.19 The article 
references The Humanitarian Law Project’s (HLP) trial; the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had asked the HLP for 
assistance in training members to use international law to resolve disputes, petitioning 
UN members for relief, and engaging in political advocacy. The case ultimately reached 
the U.S. Supreme Court, where HLP argued that 18 U.S.C. § 2338A—Providing Material 
Support to Terrorists—was unconstitutional as it violated the group’s First Amendment 
                                                 
19 Naz K Modirzadeh, Dustin A. Lewis, and Claude Bruderlein, “Humanitarian Engagement under 
Counter-terrorism: A Conflict of Norms and the Emerging Policy Landscape,” International Review of the 
Red Cross 93, no. 883 (September 2011): 632. 
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rights to free speech and association. Specifically, the HLP argued that the statute “was 
unfairly vague; that portions of the statue impermissibly criminalized pure speech and 
discriminated by content; and that the statutory provisions at stake violated the 
constitutionally enshrined freedom to associate.”20 Multiple organizations submitted 
amicus curiae briefs; one amicus brief from a collection of humanitarian agencies noted 
that the statute could have a negative effect on humanitarian aid delivery.  
The government, in turn, argued that the statute should not be voided due to 
vagueness simply because terms such as “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” 
“personnel,” and “service” are hard to define in some circumstances. The government 
also argued that the statute does not restrict members of the HLP from joining the PKK or 
LTTE or from having discussions with members of those organizations, but that the 
statute regulates activities that go beyond a discussion, including teaching the groups how 
to work the international legal system. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the statute and, in the syllabus, concluded that directly training the PKK on the use of 
international law could help the organization obtain funding, and members could use the 
knowledge as a means to promote terrorism, threaten, manipulate, or disrupt.21 The 
argument was that the PKK and LTTE were “so tainted by their criminal conduct that any 
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”22 
Elizabeth Bloodgood and Joannie Tremblay-Boire, in their article titled 
“International NGOs and National Regulation in an Age of Terrorism,” analyzed the 
impacts of counterterrorism regulations on humanitarian organizations in five countries: 
the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, and Germany.23 In three of the five 
                                                 
20 Ibid.  
21 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). Note: “As to the particular speech 
plaintiffs propose to undertake, it is wholly foreseeable that directly training the PKK on how to use 
international law to resolve disputes would provide that group with information and techniques that it could 
use as part of a broader strategy to promote terrorism, and to threaten, manipulate, and disrupt. Teaching 
the PKK to petition international bodies for relief also could help the PKK obtain funding it would redirect 
to its violent activities. Plaintiffs’ proposals to engage in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds and Tamils, 
in turn, are phrased so generally that they cannot prevail in this preenforcement challenge.” 
22 Modirzadeh, Lewis, and Bruderlein, “Humanitarian Engagement,” 634; Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project. 
23 Elizabeth A. Bloodgood and Joannie Tremblay-Boire, “International NGOs and National 
Regulation in an Age of Terrorism,” Voluntas 22, no. 1 (2011), 142–173. 
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countries (the United States, Canada, and Germany), international NGOs tested 
counterterrorism laws in court. Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire found that reactions to 
counterterrorism laws by NGOs varied, ranging from “wait and watch” (Canada) to 
engagement with legislation (United Kingdom). Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire argue 
that counterterrorism laws have not affected NGOs equally and the changes are mainly an 
extra burden of reporting and information collection rather than a cause for legal action 
against an NGO. This has led to inefficiencies and a waste of resources in accounting, 
reporting, legal fees, and bureaucratic checks of volunteers. However, according to 
Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire, the fear of counterterrorism laws or the “shadow of law” 
has caused some international NGOs to refrain from providing aid in certain areas for 
fear they will face legal repercussions. 
2. Politics and Humanitarian Aid 
A 1999 article written by Thomas G. Weiss, titled “Principles, Politics and 
Humanitarian Action,” discusses if the ICRC principles of impartiality, neutrality, and 
independence are valid in the post–Cold War era.24 Weiss argues that IHL and the 
principles of impartiality and neutrality cannot be accomplished due to the change in 
traditional warfare, i.e., disregard for IHL by war criminals, use of child fighters, use of 
foreign aid to fuel war economies, and the targeting of civilians. Weiss’s argument 
provides a foundation for the diminishing respect for IHL tha t is applicable to how NGO 
work is currently viewed during both conflict and disaster. 
According to Weiss, humanitarian organizations are either classicists or 
solidarists. Classicists, led by the ICRC, believe that humanitarian action should be 
insulated from politics. Solidarists reject impartiality and neutrality and the concept of 
permission to intervene in crisis situations. Weiss argues that the classicist approach, 
specifically the ICRCs’ principles, is no longer applicable and fails to address two types 
                                                 
24 Thomas G. Weiss, “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action,” Ethics and International Affairs 
13, no. 1 (March 1999): 3, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-7093.1999.tb00322.x. 
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of politics: “realpolitik amongst states and factional politics within them.”25 This article 
provides a counterargument to the ICRC approach during responses.  
a. Realism Theory 
Hans Morgenthau’s view of morals as a constraint on political objectives speaks 
to the gap between the two during conflict and disasters. He argues, “Moderation in 
policy cannot fail to reflect the moderation of moral judgment.”26 This is illustrated by 
the use of the military in the disaster response cases analyzed in this thesis. For instance, 
despite the United States’ stance against Indonesia for human rights violations during the 
East Timor conflict, at the time of the tsunami the United States had been funding 
Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts against U.S.-designated terrorists for years.27 
Additionally, the means of providing conflict and disaster response involved restricting 
NGOs from areas outside of Aceh where there were camps of internally displaced 
persons and insurgents. The international military response did not appear to push the 
relaxation of these restrictions and focused on the directions of the government.   
In this case, Morgenthau’s fourth and fifth principles of realism theory also apply. 
The fourth principle of Morgenthau’s theory states that political action cannot be viewed 
through the lens of universal morals, but must be based on the facts and circumstances of 
the situation.28 His fifth principle furthers the previous one by noting that nations should 
recognize interests regarding power rather than focusing on a comparison of morals. In 
all three case studies in this thesis, the stabilization of the country facing the conflict and 
disaster is imperative to counter terrorist groups that are a global threat. For the purposes 
of this thesis, Morgenthau provides a theoretical perspective for government’s reluctance 
to permit humanitarian aid and adherence to IHL.    
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition (New 
York: Knopf, 1978), 11. 
27 Adam O’Brien, “The U.S.-Indonesian Military Relationship,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
October 3, 2005, http://www.cfr.org/indonesia/us-indonesian-military-relationship/p8964. 
28 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. 
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b. Soft Power and NGOs 
The approach to counterterrorism is not solely focused on the funding and aiding 
of other countries’ fights against terrorism; countries also hope to attain buy-in with the 
important international fight against terrorism. A Congressional Research Service report 
on the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami response stated: 
The U.S. tsunami relief effort could help counter the perception among 
some Southeast Asians that the United States not only has placed too 
much emphasis on terrorism in its Southeast Asia policy but also has 
relied too heavily on “hard” (military) power to combat terrorism. The 
9/11 Commission and others have recommended expanding U.S. public 
diplomacy programs as a way to help win the global battle for “hearts and 
minds” especially in the Islamic world from which the Muslim terrorists 
seek to draw recruits and support.29 
The 2006 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism stated that the war on terror was 
like no other war. It went on to state: 
The paradigm for combating terrorism now involves the application of all 
elements of our national power and influence. Not only do we employ 
military power, we use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law 
enforcement activities to protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, 
disrupt terrorist operations and deprive our enemies of what they need to 
operate and survive.30 
Both examples show a policy shift toward a mix of hard power and soft power 
tactics in the war on terror. “Soft power” is the power of persuasion or “the ability to 
shape the preferences of others.”31 Nye argued that, to meet the goals for the war on 
terror, the United States needed the cooperation of others through the use of soft power.32 
U.S. military support for disaster efforts in Indonesia and Pakistan was a means to show 
support and improve the United States’ standing in those countries. Nye even argued that 
if the United States were “more attractive to the Pakistani populace,” it would have 
                                                 
29 Margesson, Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. 
30 White House, The President’s National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism (Washington, DC: 
Department of State, 2006). 
31 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 
2004), 5. 
32 Ibid., 129 
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greater success in convincing the Pakistani government to fight terrorism in their 
country.33 Due to their domestic and international clout, along with their ability to argue 
against actions that violate human rights, NGOs, Nye argues, are effective where hard 
power does not work. This makes them a powerful tool in convincing countries to join 
the war on terror.34 For the purposes of this thesis, Nye’s book provides the theoretical 
perspective regarding the United States’ reasoning for increased use of the military for 
humanitarian aid and the inclusion of NGOs in the war on terror. 
3. Civil-Military Coordination 
There are two essential documents that speak to civil–military coordination 
regarding counterinsurgency efforts and the use of the military for security during a 
response to a complex emergency. The 2006 U.S. Army Manual Counterinsurgency 
defines counterinsurgency as “military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, 
and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”35 The document includes 
twenty-six references to humanitarian aid workers and NGOs as key components in 
counterinsurgency efforts. This document does not appear to take into account the fact 
that NGOs are not government entities and operate under the principles of independence, 
neutrality, and impartiality. In addition, an NGO’s mission is to provide assistance, not to 
defeat an insurgency. For the purposes of this thesis, this shows that the United States 
considers NGOs a part of counterinsurgency efforts rather than independent entities. This 
can explain some of the tensions between military and humanitarian operations. 
In 2008, the UN issued Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex 
Emergencies. This document provides guidance on the use of military for security 
purposes and emphasizes that military help should be used as a last resort; operational 
control should remain with the NGO. The document specifically points out the 
importance of maintaining a clear line between humanitarian aid efforts and military 
efforts: “Sustained humanitarian access to the affected population is ensured when the 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 92 
35 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) (Washington, DC: Department of Army, 
2006), 1-1. 
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receipt of humanitarian assistance is not conditional upon the allegiance to or support to 
parties involved in a conflict but is a right independent of military and political action.”36 
This document attempts to create a common standard of military use for security by 
NGOs in both conflict and disaster response. However, as shown in the case studies in 
Chapter III, the Red Cross Movement’s disaster response does not always accept the 
guidance in this document, causing a confusing, uncoordinated response with the 
military. 
4. Perceived Negative Effects of Humanitarian Aid 
Fiona Terry’s Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action offers 
a different perspective of humanitarian aid. Terry explores the paradox of humanitarian 
aid prolonging conflicts while providing life-saving and life-sustaining actions through 
the exploitation of assistance.37 Using examples from the Congolese Wars, Khmer 
Rouge, and Afghanistan, she shows how humanitarian aid can be used to the advantage 
of warlords or those in charge to gain money or withhold aid. One particular account 
shows both the corruption and the futility of providing aid when NGOs cannot impact the 
situation: when the Médecins Sans Frontières (a medical humanitarian organization) was 
forced to question its involvement in the refugee camps in Tanzania during the Congolese 
Wars. The aid system in this situation, Fiona states, was manipulated such that it only 
served to strengthen those in power. At the time, the Tanzanian government had begun 
attempts to curb corruption and provide security to the camps, but considerable damage 
occurred. Terry states that lack of security and state support left refugee camps run by 
NGOs easy targets for massacres by Hutu forces. Raids on refugee camps across the 
border of Tanzania from Rwanda resulted in large-scale massacres and rendered attempts 
to tend to the wounded refugees futile. The Médecins Sans Frontières had begun to 
question if continued efforts were merely creating healthier people for slaughter and 
                                                 
36 United Nations, Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies (New York: 
United Nations, 2008), 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/ENGLISH%20VERSION%20Guidelines%20for%20Comple
x%20Emergencies.pdf. 
37 Fiona Terry, Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2002). 
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prolonging the conflict since the group could not affect the overall incident. This book 
provides insight into the choices faced by NGOs in situations when armed groups or 
governments do not adhere to IHL and the Geneva Conventions. 
5. Geneva Conventions 
a. Definition of NIAC 
This thesis focuses on natural disasters that occur in non-international armed 
conflicts (NIACs). NIACs are defined in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
(1949) as conflicts that involve the state and armed groups or warring armed groups 
within the territory governed by the state.38 Article 1 Protocol II, promulgated in 1977, 
extends the definition to conflicts that take place in the territory governed by the state:  
Between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized 
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and 
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 
The protocol adds that “riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts 
of a similar action” do not constitute an armed conflict.39 There are two criteria that 
trigger the IHL in a NIAC. The armed groups must show at least a low level of 
organization, and armed confrontations must meet a “minimum level of intensity.”40 The 
actions, capabilities, and resources of the state and the armed groups, and the impacts on 
civilians, determine a “minimum level of intensity.”41 “Organization” factors include 
established chain of command, recruiting, training and planning capabilities, and ability 
to carry out and enforce orders.42 The motivation of the armed group is not a factor in 
deciding whether or not a conflict is a NIAC.  
                                                 
38 ICRC, The Law of Armed Conflict: Non-international Armed Conflict (Geneva, Switzerland: ICRC, 
2002), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law10_final.pdf. 
39 Ibid. 




During a NIAC, the armed groups do not have combatant status, which means 
they are considered civilians who are subject to laws.43 Under these circumstances, the 
state maintains its sovereignty and authority to use all legitimate means to reestablish 
order and “defend its national unity or territorial integrity.”44 Armed groups and states 
are expected to adhere to IHL in a NIAC, with states signing treaties to attest that they 
will follow IHL in all conflicts.  
b. State Obligations to Provide Aid 
David Fisher’s article “Domestic Regulation of International Humanitarian Relief 
in Disasters and Armed Conflict: A Comparative Analysis” examines the regulatory 
controls and the provision of aid in non-conflict disasters and conflicts. Fisher argues that 
while the regulatory issues are similar, the dynamics and application of international laws 
are different.45 This article also speaks to the ambiguities of applying IHL during internal 
armed conflicts. 
In armed conflicts, Fisher found, security is the primary concern and often 
outweighs the state’s need to provide humanitarian aid. In addition, internal armed 
conflicts—which Fisher states are the current predominant form of war—have multiple 
de facto authorities imposing regulatory controls over humanitarian aid that lead to 
deliberate hindrances to aid. He also argues that there is a difference in the application of 
international law in the two situations.  
Fisher’s analysis also found that IHL has a broader acceptance and scope in 
armed conflict, as well as specific rights and obligations, but the extent of the 
government’s responsibilities to provide aid is ambiguous. These ambiguities, he 
explains, are particular to internal armed conflicts. Fisher lists the applicable Geneva 
Convention articles that apply to the facilitation of humanitarian aid in conflicts but notes 
that there is no equivalent language for internal armed conflicts. According to Fisher, the 
ICRC commentary on Article 18, which argues that the provision of aid “shall be 
                                                 
43 ICRC, Law of Armed Conflict 
44 Ibid. 
45 Fisher, “Domestic Regulation,” 345. 
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undertaken,” implies that “once relief actions are accepted in principle, the authorities are 
under obligation to co-operate, in particular by facilitating the rapid transit of relief 
consignments and by ensuring the safety of convoys.”46 An ICRC study of customary 
laws showed that customary law rules developed in internal conflicts have routinely 
supported the acceptance of Article 18.47 
While Fisher does not examine disasters during conflict, he does provide 
distinctions in the application of IHL between the two situations. For the purposes of this 
thesis, Fisher’s article shows how international law is applied when the government is 
focused on security measures rather than humanitarian aid.  
E. BACKGROUND: RED CROSS MOVEMENT OPERATIONS IN 
CONFLICTS AND DISASTERS 
The Red Cross Movement’s operations are conducted in accordance with both its 
seven fundamental principles and the “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief.”48 
The seven principles—humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary 
service, universality, and unity—were adopted in 1965 and provide the base for the 
Movement’s beliefs and conduct during disaster relief efforts. The Code of Conduct 
further functions to “guard the standards of behavior” to preserve independence.49 The 
Code is written to guide disaster relief efforts in the field and is to be adapted in 
accordance with IHL during relief efforts in conflict situations. It emphasizes that the Red 
Cross Movement will provide aid regardless of race, creed, nationality, or religious 
 
 
                                                 
46 Ibid., 351. 
47 Ibid. 
48 “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief,” ICRC, accessed February 23, 2017, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-1067.pdf. 
49 Ibid., 1. 
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affiliation, as an independent entity, and that aid will be determined based on need.50 The 
code states that the Movement will 
never knowingly—or through negligence—allow for workers to be used to 
gather information of political, military or economically sensitive nature 
for government or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those 
which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign 
policy of donor governments.51 
In 1997, the ICRC adopted the Seville Agreement. Under this agreement, the 
ICRC is assigned as the main coordinating agency during a response to international and 
non-international armed conflicts, to include “armed conflict concomitant with natural or 
technological disasters.”52 The IFRC and RCRC Societies maintain their steady-state 
lead roles established with their home governments. In non-conflict responses, the RCRC 
Societies are the lead for the response. The society within the impacted country serves as 
the lead, and all other responding societies report to it. The ICRC maintains relationships 
with armed groups as well as the state. 
During the armed conflict, the entities share operational resources and coordinate 
all operations, to include restoration of family links, transportation of wounded, and 
provision of food and healthcare. The RCRC Societies may support the ICRC outside of 
their country: 
• by managing projects which the ICRC delegates to them entirely; 
• by making a financial contribution towards ICRC operations; 
• by making donations in kind or 
• by lending staff.53 
RCRC Society missions during conflict and disaster operations also focus on 
providing support to their home military. Issues between the military and the Red Cross 
                                                 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 3. 
52 “Agreement on the Organization of the International Activities of the Components of the 
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,” IFRC, November 26, 1997, 5, 
http://www.ifrc.org/Global/Governance/Policies/Seville_Agreement.pdf. 
53 “Cooperation with the National Societies,” ICRC, October 29, 2010, https://www.icrc.org/eng/what-
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Movement, in particular, are complex. RCRC Societies in some countries support their 
home country’s troops in conflicts. The American Red Cross provides volunteers to 
support its military on bases around the world. This duty is not subject to the principles of 
independence, neutrality, and impartiality; it is a means of acting as the auxiliary to the 
government. Under Section 1-7c of Army Regulation 930-5, the American Red Cross 
“will furnish the Department of the Army such information as may be required to assist 
the commander concerned in determining the loyalty and acceptability of Red Cross 
personnel selected for duty at Army installations and deployment operations.”54  
Although the Red Cross Movement’s rules state that using the military to provide 
security in the provision of aid is not allowable, these rules are not always followed by 
the RCRC Societies. In Iraq, for instance, Red Cross Movement entities involved in 
humanitarian response during the Iraq war had different approaches to civil–military 
coordination. Societies relied on the military to provide security while the ICRC refused 
such support, despite a car bomb attack on its headquarters.55 The 2014 U.S. Army 
manual Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies specifically states that the ICRC 
intentionally rejects the use of military support in order to maintain the principles of 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence.56 
  
                                                 
54 Department of the Army, American National Red Cross Service Program and Army Utilization (AR 
930-5) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army), 1, http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r930_5.pdf. 
55 Pierre Hazan and Jean-François Berger, “Humanitarian Action: From Risk to Real Danger,” The 
Magazine of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 1 (2004): 4–9. 
56 Department of the Army, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5) 
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2014), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf. 
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II. POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES WITH 
HUMANITARIAN AID 
The ICRC has claimed that recent security actions (counterterrorism laws and the 
use of the military to conduct humanitarian aid) have impacted the organization’s ability 
to provide humanitarian aid in NIACs and, by extension, disaster response during a 
NIAC. A historical look at humanitarian aid operations in NIACs, however, demonstrates 
that the Red Cross Movement repeatedly faced political and military hindrances before 
the recent counterterrorism laws and increased military humanitarian aid. During World 
War II, the German government blocked the ICRC from visiting and aiding in 
concentration camps.57 In 1968, the Nigerian government stopped Red Cross aid during 
the Nigerian–Biafran conflict when it discovered the armed groups were using Red Cross 
transports to bring weapons into Biafra.58 While counterterrorism laws and military 
humanitarian aid efforts have contributed to perception issues, they are not the only cause 
for restrictions on humanitarian aid. The increasing lack of political will to adhere to IHL 
in the interest of security concerns has heavily contributed to the restriction of 
humanitarian aid. 
The application of IHL has increasingly come into question, which has led to an 
increase in restrictions on humanitarian aid resources for security reasons. In times of 
conflict, the ICRC is mandated under the Geneva Conventions to conduct its own 
independent assessment on the situation’s “conflict” status.59 According to Kathleen 
Lawland, who formerly directed the ICRC unit that counsels on application of the laws in 
armed conflict, “Although the ICRC’s legal classification of a situation of violence does 
not bind a state, the ICRC’s specific mandate under the Geneva Conventions and its 
historic role in the development of IHL gives a particular weight to its classifications, 
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which a state must consider in good faith.”60 There are times, however, when the state 
does not abide by the established agreements, refuses to establish agreements, or sees 
operations as law enforcement situations rather than NIACs.  
A. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW  
In some cases, humanitarian aid work is stopped for security reasons. For 
instance, the Pakistani government’s actions to combat armed groups were considered 
law enforcement operations that did not fall under IHL or the Geneva Conventions.61 The 
ICRC was not allowed to enter the conflict-impacted areas for security reasons. Another 
example occurred during the conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. The Indonesian government, 
before the tsunami of 2004, enacted a law that banned any NGO actions that countered 
the Martial Law Administration’s rules and dictated that all actions must be run through 
the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare.62  
As discussed in the previous section, NGOs’ attempts to maintain independence, 
neutrality, and impartiality can impede the state and cause security risks. Still, IHL and 
the Geneva Conventions allow for the Red Cross Movement to maintain a presence in 
conflicts. In the last three decades, however, the conduct of conflicts has not fit into the 
rules of IHL and the Geneva Conventions. Weiss pointed out that the Geneva 
Conventions and IHL became irrelevant in NIACs in the 1990s.63 During this period, war 
criminals’ disregard for IHL, use of child fighters and foreign aid to fuel war economies, 
and targeting of civilians had become more prevalent in conflicts.64  
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Terrorism on American soil led to the Global War on Terror, which is not a war 
with a state or states, like World War II or the Cold War, but a war on the poorly defined 
concept of “terror.” The 2006 National Strategy for Combatting Terrorism stated: 
Our strategy also recognizes that the War on Terror is a different kind of 
war. From the beginning, it has been both a battle of arms and a battle of 
ideas. Not only do we fight our terrorist enemies on the battlefield, we 
promote freedom and human dignity as alternatives to the terrorists’ 
perverse vision of oppression and totalitarian rule. The paradigm for 
combating terrorism now involves the application of all elements of our 
national power and influence. Not only do we employ military power, we 
use diplomatic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement activities to 
protect the Homeland and extend our defenses, disrupt terrorist operations 
and deprive our enemies of what they need to operate and survive.65 
The Strategy statement uses terms like “fight on the battlefield” and “law 
enforcement activities,” which makes it appear that the strategy mixes conflict and law 
enforcement operations. This is outside the definitions in the Geneva Conventions, which 
does make the war on terror a “different kind of war.” In accordance with Geneva 
Conventions Article 1 Protocol II of 1977, isolated acts of terrorism are not considered a 
conflict.66 For example, the Syrian civil war that began in 2012 now involves the Islamic 
State. The Islamic State is an extremist group that had been making gains in Iraq and 
crossed the Iraqi border to fight the Syrian government.67 The Syrian war is considered a 
NIAC. The Islamic State has also been linked to several terrorist attacks outside of Iraq 
and Syria. In 2015, terrorist attacks occurred in sixteen countries, including the United 
States, France, Canada, and Australia, and were committed by people directly linked to 
the Islamic State or inspired by the group.68 The acts committed in those sixteen 
countries are not acts of war under the Geneva Conventions. The term “internationalized 
NIAC” has been suggested as a way of describing this type of occurrence. An 
internationalized NIAC is described by the ICRC as   
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• One or more third States or an international/regional organization (the 
states or the organization acting through a multinational force) intervene in 
support of a state involved in an armed conflict against an organized 
armed group 
• One or more third States or an international/regional organization (the 
states or the organization acting through a multinational force) intervene in 
support of an organized armed group involved in an armed conflict against 
a state69 
A third category—a combination of the previous two—also exists. According to 
the ICRC, this is not a legally recognized type of conflict, but the first two categories 
could evolve into an international armed conflict (IAC) or NIAC. The resulting 
application of IHL is mixed when a conflict does not fit under the traditional IAC or 
NIAC definitions.70 
The application of IHL in an undefined conflict is dependent on the relationship 
of the party to the conflict. If an outside state is involved, it is bound by the rules for an 
IAC, while the state and armed group in conflict are bound by the rules of a NIAC.71 If 
the situation is not a NIAC or an IAC, IHL is not in effect when states react to the 
situation; the state enforces domestic laws against those who broke them. The ICRC, 
however, has argued that Article 18 of the Geneva Conventions and customary laws 
provide for the facilitation of unimpeded aid delivery.72 
The ICRC has also argued that IHL is not the problem; the lack of support from 
states is the problem. States will deny that a conflict is a NIAC because the violent acts of 
criminals or terrorists do not fit under the definition of a NIAC.73 This is within their 
sovereign right. The ICRC assessments of a situation are not binding. Non-state actors or 
armed groups argue that they do not have to follow IHL because it is a state-constructed 
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system that they are trying to fight.74 The ICRC also cites a significant lack of political 
will to implement IHL when political objectives are contrary to the “rules and spirit of 
humanitarian law.”75 These three issues are evident in all three cases analyzed in Chapter 
III, and resulted in the restrictions on the provision of aid, to include the importing of 
resources into the area.  
B. CONTROL OF RESOURCES 
The restrictions imposed on the Red Cross Movement entities are considered a 
violation of IHL (when the situation is considered a NIAC by the ICRC) and the 
principles of neutrality and impartiality. However, actual or potential corruption of aid by 
armed groups can cause the state to impose restrictions on resources that are considered 
necessary security measures. Resources are the crux of a military operation and a 
humanitarian response to a conflict. Mary Anderson, president of the Collaborative for 
Development Action, stated, when discussing the impacts of NGO aid in Africa, that 
“resources under the control of one or another warring faction help buttress the power 
and continuing legitimacy of that warring faction.”76 
A 2012 message from the UN Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance 
(OCHA) regarding humanitarian access lists the following barriers to the provision of 
humanitarian aid that can occur during conflicts, and notes that they may exist in 
disasters:  
• bureaucratic restrictions on personnel and humanitarian supplies 
• impediments related to climate, terrain or lack of infrastructure 
• the diversion of aid, and interference in the delivery of relief and 
implementation of activities 
• active fighting and military operations 
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• Attacks on humanitarian personnel, goods, and facilities.77 
Three of those bullets (the first, third, and fifth) relate to the restriction of 
resources during a conflict. In conflict cases, NGOs are often unable to bring in workers 
and relief supplies due to restrictions on visas, stricter customs laws, and lengthy security 
checks. The Red Cross Movement’s relationship with governments has facilitated its 
ability to sidestep these to a certain extent, but the group still faces issues with 
distribution of aid resources. Though it does not specifically include counterterrorism 
laws, OCHA defines bureaucratic restrictions as “restrictions imposed by state and non-
state actors on personnel and humanitarian supplies. This includes donor governments’ 
funding restrictions on engaging with Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Hamas in Gaza, and 
domestic legislations criminalizing the provision of ‘material support’ to designated 
foreign terrorist organizations.”78 The definition refers to “material support” and 
“funding restrictions,” which are restrictions found in U.S. counterterrorism laws. 
Counterterrorism laws are newer bureaucratic restrictions than customs and tax 
laws, but their intent to stop funding and material support to armed groups is not a new 
concept. However, NGOs have seen them as another form of political hindrance in the 
provision of aid. 
1. Counterterrorism Laws 
Counterterrorism laws seek to restrict the flow of resources to armed groups. 
Language in counterterrorism laws established following the war on terror declaration 
has caused concern that the laws further undermine the Geneva Conventions and IHL. 
This impacts the ICRC’s ability to obtain consent from governments to provide aid. In a 
2013 speech, Christine Beerli, ICRC permanent vice president, specifically calls 
governments out for the role they play in the denial, prohibition, and criminalization of 
contact with and material support to armed groups, to include armed groups that are only 
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taking part in a NIAC.79 Beerli goes on to point out that the laws use a vague definition 
of what constitutes “material support,” arguing that this vagueness could preclude any 
interaction at all with armed groups.80  
While the definition remains vague, the impacts of these measures are unclear.81 
NGOs have proactively filed court cases to determine the extent these laws apply to their 
operations, with mixed results.82 Bloodgood and Tremblay-Boire’s analysis of the 
impacts of counterterrorism laws on NGOs in five countries found that they caused 
administrative burdens and mainly impacted smaller NGOs. The conclusion of a 
Humanitarian Policy Group study stated that counterterrorism measures are necessary, 
but the current actions impose on NGOs in five areas: funding levels, administrative 
burden, relations with communities, transparency, and coordination.83 The study argued 
that “rigid and over-zealous” adherence to counterterrorism laws would tie humanitarian 
aid efforts to political objectives and “unravel the legitimacy and acceptance of 
humanitarian response,” causing negative impacts to those five areas.84 Both articles 
suggest that for larger NGOs, such as the Red Cross Movement, counterterrorism laws 
may exacerbate preexisting perception issues but have little impact on the groups’ overall 
operations.  
The Humanitarian Policy Group article suggests that counterterrorism laws should 
be framed in terms of IHL in order to “preserve neutral and impartial humanitarian 
action, and protect the ability of victims of conflict to receive relief.”85 If IHL does not 
change to account for terrorist acts as a form of conflict, humanitarian aid is not seen as 
advantageous, but as a corruptible avenue for terrorists; changes based on IHL would 
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therefore be ineffectual. Corruption by armed groups is prevalent—in particular, the use 
of NGOs for financial gain. 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) comprises thirty-four countries and two 
regional organizations that “set standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, 
regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and 
other financial threats.”86 FATF points to exploitation of non-profit organizations (NPOs) 
as a risk.87 FATF’s 2014 Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-profit Organisations argues that, 
due to their ability to easily access materials, funds, and networks with low levels of 
external scrutiny, terrorist entities see NPOs as high-value targets to exploit.88 Al-
Shabaab in Somalia regulated humanitarian aid agencies, forcing them to follow the 
terrorist group’s rules and instituting taxes to fund its operations and restricted aid in 
certain areas.89 In a Humanitarian Policy Group research project that conducted eighty 
interviews, “former Al-Shabaab officials reported that they forbade aid agencies from 
engaging in any activities that empowered traditional or local leaders outside of Al-
Shabaab.”90 The project found that agencies faced greater restrictions and enforcement 
when Al-Shabaab leaders and the community came from different clans.91 This meant 
that not only were NGOs funding Al-Shabaab efforts, they were also unable to deliver 
resources in accordance with the principles of impartiality and neutrality. The 
government and armed groups’ actions can have significant impacts on the perception of 
the RCRC Societies and ICRC operations, which hinders negotiations and the ability to 
provide humanitarian aid. Al-Shabaab’s actions led to the ICRC pulling out of the Al-
Shabaab-held areas altogether rather than adhering to its rules.92  
                                                 
86 For more information about FATF reference: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ashley Jackson and Abdi Aynte, “Al-Shabaab Engagement with Aid Agencies,” HPG Policy Brief 







In October of 2001, FATF issued eight special recommendations to stop funding 
mechanisms for terrorists. Recommendation number eight ensures that NPOs cannot be 
abused by terrorist organizations.93 FATF does state that countries should take a targeted 
approach to applying regulations to only those NPOs that do not have mechanisms in 
place to avoid abuse by terrorist groups.94 Regulating NGOs meant including 
counterterrorism clauses in contract and grant funding, which direct NGOs to conduct 
monitoring of personnel, partners, and beneficiaries, and to divert funds.95 Numerous 
NGOs claimed these requirements created extra compliance burden that negatively 
impacted operations.96 
The 2014 FATF report Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non-profit Organizations cites 
reports from OCHA and the Norwegian Refugee Council that indicate these new rules 
have interfered and distorted the principle of impartiality.97 It also found that regulations 
are not administered evenly among NPOs and exceptions have been made for certain 
NPOs that are not in agreement with counterterror efforts in some countries. The 
Australian Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) found 
exceptions for humanitarian actions were inconsistent with Australian Criminal Code and 
UN counterterrorism resolutions.98 The INSLM argued only “high capacity 
organisations” that have shown they are reliable, specifically naming the ICRC as an 
example, should receive exceptions to counterterrorism measures.99 The FATF report 
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points out that exceptions are determined and approved by countries, essentially leaving 
NPOs at the mercy of countries that are not supportive of humanitarian aid.  
A 2015 Harvard Law School study of countries’ adherence to UN Security 
Council Resolution 2178 examined impacts of counterterrorism measures on NGOs.100 
The study looked at the laws and six concerns of the NGOs: heightened administrative 
and programmatic burdens, decreased freedom of movement, increased governmental 
scrutiny, decreased access to finances, reputational harm, and decreased autonomy in 
dealing with all parties in an armed conflict. The United States earned a compliance score 
of 46 out of 50, and a score of 37.5 out of 50 in the category of “support of five key 
aspects of principled humanitarian action in counterterrorism contexts.”101 If an NGO 
wants to work in an area where there are U.S. sanctions, the NGO must apply for a 
license, which includes undergoing a background check before working in the area. 
However, the research did not show that there were criminal or civil cases against NGO 
workers working in conflict zones with terrorist operations. This is not surprising since 
the U.S. government would be able to control who gets a license and who does not. A 
license does not release an NGO from the other laws that govern NGO actions, such as 
those imposed by USAID for grant funding or the material support laws.  
Where NGOs may not be able to provide aid due to counterterrorism laws, the 
military can fill in the gaps. Military assets can provide not only the relief supplies 
needed but also the security and logistical support that allows for the quick delivery of 
aid. However, there are perception and information-sharing issues that result in confusion 
and that can hinder NGO response. 
2. Military Humanitarian Aid  
In addition to counterterrorism laws and financial regulations, humanitarian aid 
missions conducted by military forces have increased in areas where there is conflict.102 
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This increase has led to an encroachment on “humanitarian space” and blurred civil–
military boundaries. The use of military as a means for aid in security or law enforcement 
operations is increasing. Although this does ensure that resources are secured, aid that is 
tied to a military carries that military’s issues with it, particularly if the military is 
considered the enemy by local armed groups or civilians. In the 2010 Pakistan floods, the 
ICRC refused to work with NATO and the Pakistani military due to their involvement in 
security operations.103  
Following the September 11th attacks, political language regarding NGOs 
focused on their importance in the war on terror. In October of 2001, U.S. Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, in a speech at the National Foreign Policy Conference for Non-
governmental Leaders, aligned NGOs with government and military efforts, stating that 
NGOs are a force multiplier for the United States and a part of the U.S. combat team.104 
He would go on to point out NGOs’ efforts to aid innocent Afghans, ignoring the fact that 
the NGOs may have also provided aid to Taliban fighters under the impartiality and 
neutrality principles.105 NGOs and analysts reacted negatively to Powell’s comments, as 
they undermined the perception of neutrality, impartiality, and independence.106 
Military guidance repeatedly refers to NGOs as partners in counterinsurgency 
efforts. The 2006 U.S. Army counterinsurgency manual defines counterinsurgency as 
“military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat insurgency.”107 The document includes twenty-six references to 
humanitarian aid workers and lists NGOs as key components in counterinsurgency 
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efforts. This document does not take into account that NGOs are not government entities 
and that they operate under the principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality. 
Also, their mission is to provide assistance, not to defeat an insurgency. While military 
groups and NGOs may work within the same areas to provide humanitarian aid, the 
missions are different and should be clear. At a roundtable on civil–military coordination 
in 2011, the discussion recognized that military counterinsurgency and stabilization 
strategies in communities mirror NGOs’ approach. The difference is that military tactics 
may involve “arming local militia to protect their communities, for example, [which] is 
not the same as building community resilience to protection threats and can generate new 
or exacerbate existing threats to the civilian population.”108 Regardless of this distinction, 
the 2014 revision of the counterinsurgency manual softens its language regarding NGOs, 
acknowledging that they maintain independence, but still counts them as a part of the 
counterinsurgency effort.109 These ties to the military can cause the perception that 
NGOs, to include the Red Cross Movement, are extensions of counterinsurgency efforts. 
In 2008 the UN issued the Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex 
Emergencies in response to the increased use of the military by NGOs to provide security 
for humanitarian aid delivery. The document states that humanitarian access is “not 
conditional upon the allegiance to or support to parties involved in a conflict but is a right 
independent of military and political action.”110 However, there has been an increased 
tendency by NGOs to use military forces to deliver humanitarian aid in insecure areas. 
The guidelines emphasize that military forces are to be used as a last resort and 
operational control should remain with the NGO. 
Information-sharing is a particular problem between NGOs and the military. The 
ICRC has established agreements that allow it to maintain silence on its operations. The 
military may not be able to share operational or tactical information with the ICRC. The 
summary of the 2011 round table on civil–military coordination also noted a level of 
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mistrust by NGOs that militaries would use information inappropriately.111 The ICRC 
published Professional Standards for Protection Work, which gives guidance on data 
collection and data sharing. The language in the document highlights the issues; many 
mirror the concerns of asking a military to provide security. When discussing the 
interface between UN forces and internationally mandated militaries and police forces, 
the document states: “Whatever the context, dialogue, and interaction must take place in 
a manner that neither undermines adherence to the humanitarian principles of 
independence and impartiality nor exposes affected populations or humanitarian workers 
to greater risks.”112 
C. POLITICS AND THE RED CROSS MOVEMENT 
To avoid or mitigate political and military hindrances during conflict and disaster 
response, some argue it is better for NGOs to adopt a more political approach. As 
discussed in Chapter I, Weiss’s “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action” article, 
written two years after the Seville Agreement, defines the ICRC approach as classicist, 
meaning it follows an apolitical approach that does not account for realpolitik or 
recognize the political repercussions of its actions.113 To bridge the gap between 
humanitarian and political objectives, Weiss argues that the ICRC should capitalize on 
the power it possesses to influence conflicts. The Red Cross Movement’s seven code of 
conduct principles represent an altruistic, unattainable goal.114 Weiss argues that because 
their actions are influenced by politics, NGOs cannot turn a blind eye to political 
machinations. Therefore, NGOs need to act as “political humanitarians” and recognize 
that their actions are not disassociated from politics.115 
The Red Cross Movement, however, already has a presence in politics. Its roles 
are spelled out in agreements and charters with states prior to conflict and in the Geneva 
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Conventions and IHL. The Movement also maintains a political presence through the 
RCRC Societies. As auxiliaries, the RCRC Societies can be very closely tied to the 
government, and their leaders may even act as advisors to state leaders. The president of 
the Indonesian Red Crescent Society was an advisor to the Indonesian president during 
the 2004 tsunami response. Regardless of its relationship with the government, the Red 
Cross Movement will still only be allowed to act with the consent of the “parties to an 
armed conflict.”116 Since NGOs have no “hard power,” i.e., military strength, and must 
rely on the power of persuasion, it could be argued that the Red Cross Movement is only 
able to achieve humanitarian aid work because of its principles. It is for this reason that 
the perception of the Red Cross Movement is critical. 
D. A MATTER OF PERCEPTION 
The main effect of counterterrorism laws and increased military humanitarian aid 
is perception issues. The perceived stronger ties to military and political objectives 
outlined in counterinsurgency efforts have eroded trust of NGOs and opened them up to 
increased attacks. In Indonesia, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Sri Lanka, NGOs have 
faced backlash due to the perception that they are furthering the Western Judeo–Christian 
agenda. Armed groups in Pakistan refused to allow the ICRC and Pakistani Red Crescent 
Societies to provide aid, believing the NGOs were involved with security operations.117 
The information requirements and vetting process to receive assistance have led 
to the belief that NGOs are complicit with political views and need justification for 
providing aid.118 The largest NGOs, to include the ICRC, have close ties to the Western 
world because the majority of their funding coming from Western countries. These 
countries also provide military support in major conflicts. 
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In recent conflicts such as Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan the United States and 
other Western countries have not been neutral bystanders, but instead have been 
participants in the conflicts.119 Monica Krause argues that adherence to the principle of 
“independence” is measured by an NGO’s distance from the United States due to the U.S. 
role in current conflicts.120 Distance from the United States is difficult to attain; while the 
ICRC and the RCRC Societies rely on donors for response, they also rely heavily on 
government funding. Western countries, in particular the United States and the United 
Kingdom, are the largest donors of financial assistance to NGOs. In 2014, the Red Cross 
Movement appealed to the United States for $1.6 billion and received $1.4 billion in 
funds for responses in the South Sudan, Central African Republic, Liberia, Syria, 
Lebanon, and Ukraine.121 The United States and European governments represented 83 
percent of government funding for humanitarian assistance overall in 2014.122 
Just like the restriction of humanitarian aid for political objectives, perception 
issues are not new. NGOs have been unable to shake civilians’ and armed groups’ 
perception that NGOs are Western Judeo–Christian groups that foster Western 
government ideals—this perception has held fast in both conflict and non-conflict 
situations, and prior to recent counterterrorism laws and increased military humanitarian 
aid. During the Congolese Wars, before recent security actions, the Congolese believed 
that the Rwandans were helped by the “white people’s aid groups.” Jason K. Stearns, in 
his book Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, quotes Pentecostal Reverend Kapala, who 
stated, “First the white people bring the refugees here; then they refuse to help us!” 123 
He went on to state, “The international community has all the power. You can’t tell me 
that the United States, the biggest superpower in the world, could not stop this if they had 
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wanted to. They didn’t stop it because they didn’t want to.”124 David Rieff suggests that 
humanitarian aid is viewed as a means of colonizing a country. He points out that white, 
Western humanitarian aid workers in developing countries will live in former cabinet 
ministers’ houses and have local drivers while making and directing changes.125 Rieff 
argues that while the workers are there to help, they maintain the image of Western 
power.126 When a humanitarian agency works with a military that is considered hostile, 
this image is further reinforced. 
Attacks on humanitarian aid workers are increasing. In an article entitled 
“Humanitarian Action: From Risk to Real Danger,” Michel Cagneux, the head of the 
ICRC’s security unit, is quoted as saying some actors “are caught in an unequal struggle 
and have no hesitation in resorting to non-conventional methods of warfare such as 
attacks on humanitarian organizations, considered ‘soft targets.’”127 At an August 2014 
meeting of the UN Security Council tribute to fallen personnel, Deputy Secretary-General 
Jan Eliasson stated that, in 2013, there had been 155 humanitarian workers reportedly 
killed, 171 wounded, and 134 kidnapped.128 This was a 66-percent increase from 2012. 
Masood Karokhail, director of The Liaison Office in Afghanistan, stated that in 
Afghanistan, from 2001 to the first quarter of 2014, 895 humanitarian workers were 
attacked and 325 killed.129 Armed groups have issued statements that attacks on 
humanitarian workers align with their efforts to stop the enemy. A week before the 
bombing of the UN compound in Iraq, Mullah Omar, a Taliban leader, issued a statement 
that identified the worst enemies of Islam and humanity to be “Jews and Christians, 
America, Great Britain, the UN and all Western humanitarian organizations.”130 
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The implications of tying NGOs to military efforts, or at least blurring the lines 
between them, have varying impacts depending on the views of civilians regarding the 
military. In April of 2012, in an interview for the 16th Tokyo Defense Forum, Larry 
Maybee, the ICRC regional delegate to armed forces for Asia and the Pacific, was asked 
about the role of armies in disaster response during an armed conflict. He stated there 
might be a perception issue with militaries within the country or militaries from abroad 
that leads to perception issues for NGOs: 
Military may be viewed with suspicion or worse by the local population; 
in extreme cases they may be actively involved in the conflict or violence, 
conducting operations in the disaster-affected region. There is also the 
danger that their humanitarian response and the relief they provide is not 
impartial but rather distributed with political and/or military objectives, for 
example, to win the hearts and minds of the population. 
The Director of Médecins Sans Frontières-USA De Torrente, in the article “Humanitarian 
Action under Attack,” states: 
When governments drape their military and political actions in the cloak 
of humanitarian concerns, they undermine humanitarian action’s essential 
purpose: the unconditional provision of assistance to those in need. When 
all aid efforts are presented and perceived as being at the service of 
political and military objectives, it is more difficult and dangerous for 
independent humanitarian organizations to carry out their work.131 
E. CONCLUSION 
The gap between humanitarian aid and political objectives is not easily bridged, 
and bridges that may be built are often rickety and easily burned when their actions result 
in security issues. IHL and the Geneva Conventions provide a bridge that received buy-in 
from states, but it is uncertain if they were ever reasonable when put up against political 
objectives. When ICRC Co-founder Henry Dunant won the Noble Peace Prize for his 
humanitarian work, Bertha Von Suttner expressed her disagreement with the decision, 
stating that his work on IHL and the Geneva Convention simply acted to improve the 
                                                 
131 Ibid.  
 40 
laws of war; “improving the laws of war,” she said, “[is] like regulating the temperature 
when boiling someone in oil.”132  
The war on terror is a different kind of war. Actions to combat terrorism in 
countries like Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Pakistan where the governments are in conflict 
with armed groups are considered law enforcement actions, which are not considered 
subject to IHL. This has left NGOs and the Red Cross Movement increasingly unable to 
respond under the traditional IHL and Geneva Convention banner. Without the ability to 
exercise its role as guardian of IHL and the Geneva Conventions, the ICRC has to rely on 
its reputation to make headway during negotiations. Counterterrorism laws and 
competing military humanitarian aid have furthered the perception that NGOs are 
extensions of enemy countries rather than independent, neutral, and impartial entities 
there to help everyone. This can have far-reaching implications, from the increased 
attacks on aid workers to a significant reduction in funding from donors. In conflicts, this 
may not seem as significant; but when a natural disaster happens and the government 
cannot provide for its citizens, it must rely on humanitarian aid to keep survivors, to 
include the politicians and military that were suffering from the conflict, alive. 
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III. CASE STUDIES IN NATURAL DISASTERS AND CONFLICT: 
UNEXPECTED VULNERABILITY 
Disasters pose a different challenge for states during a conflict and can be 
devastating politically. Natural disasters are non-discriminatory and expand beyond the 
conflict boundaries. So while a conflict may be in one part of the country, where the state 
and the military may have an established response, a natural disaster may overwhelm the 
government’s capabilities and resources. When a state’s response capability is 
overwhelmed, it is vulnerable; it must refocus efforts and reallocate resources to ensure 
citizens can recover. In some cases, the armed group or “terrorists” can provide for the 
population when there is no local government, allowing the group to more effectively 
gain support.   
In a review of the humanitarian response in Sri Lanka, John Goodhand and Bart 
Klem noted: “Although natural disasters are in a sense ‘nondiscriminatory,’ war affected 
countries have higher preexisting levels of vulnerability, whilst the distribution of 
vulnerability tends to be geographically concentrated in the areas most affected by 
violence.”133 By the principles of the Red Cross Movement, this means the people in 
concentrated areas of violence would be the primary focus during the response. However, 
due to political objectives, there can be restrictions that do not allow for the most 
vulnerable to receive aid.134 During the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in 
Indonesia and the 2010 flooding in Pakistan, the Red Cross Movement’s activities were 
restricted to certain areas for what the government called security reasons. This left those 
in restricted areas without access to relief supplies.  
The three issues discussed in the previous chapter do not necessarily translate to a 
disaster response. However, the two most important issues—political objectives and 
military humanitarian aid—do apply in disasters. Conflict-related political objectives 
remain the same from conflict to disaster response. How the government views the 
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situation drives the way it responds to a disaster. In Indonesia and Sri Lanka, the 
government and the armed groups called a ceasefire. Despite the ceasefire in Sri Lanka, 
some political parties disagreed with the coordination efforts with the LTTE and stopped 
these efforts.135 
Local and international militaries play a large part in disaster response by not only 
conducting security operations, but also providing aid. In all three case studies used in 
this thesis, the military either led the disaster response efforts (Indonesia) or played a 
significant role in the response (Sri Lanka and Pakistan). In Pakistan and Indonesia, 
security operations continued during the disaster response. In all three countries, the 
armed groups continued attacks. If the military is the leading entity for disaster response 
and apart from the conflict, as it is in the three case studies, the perception issues for 
NGOs falling in line with military efforts are the same as those in conflict. 
Disaster response brings a slew of actors and, with them, more resources that 
were not involved in the conflict originally; these resources can compromise the security 
situation through relaxed customs and visa regulations. As in conflict response, resources 
are imperative to a successful disaster response. The government is in charge of the 
allocation of resources in a disaster and faces the challenges that come with an influx of 
resources. A common associated legal issue is the overregulation of incoming resources 
and personnel.  
IFRC Vice President Dr. Jaslin Salmon, speaking on the topic of IHL and 
humanitarian assistance in 2011, stated that, in disasters and conflicts, the most common 
barriers are “bureaucratic bottlenecks” that include delays in or denial of visas for aid 
workers, clearance of goods and supplies through customs, and taxation of NGOs.136 The 
government may relax customs and visa laws to facilitate the influx of relief supplies due 
to security issues (e.g., the use of relaxed customs laws allowed for fraudulent NGOs to 
ship weapons mixed in with relief supplies); the government may then respond by 
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overregulating, creating delays in the provision of aid.137 The 2012 OCHA message 
regarding humanitarian access referenced in Chapter II listed five barriers to 
humanitarian aid in conflict, but the message also notes that these may be the same in 
disasters. Once again, the barriers are: 
• bureaucratic restrictions on personnel and humanitarian supplies 
• impediments related to climate, terrain or lack of infrastructure 
• the diversion of aid, and interference in the delivery of relief and 
implementation of activities 
• active fighting and military operations 
• attacks on humanitarian personnel, goods, and facilities138 
The issues of counterterrorism laws (OCHA lumps the restrictions laid out in the 
laws under “bureaucratic restrictions”) and IHL are not necessarily applicable to a 
disaster response. Counterterrorism laws are not often raised as an issue during disaster 
response. International counterterrorism efforts do play a role in the response; in Sri 
Lanka, the U.S. military avoided “rebel strongholds in the north.”139 
There is a debate over the applicable laws that pertain to the protections of 
civilians in a conflict-zone disaster. It has been argued that application of IHL in a 
disaster would be impractical because the boundaries of a disaster can extend beyond the 
conflict area.140 However, disaster-related internally displaced person (IDP) camps 
outside of the conflict area may be harbors for or targets of armed groups. If this is the 
case, then conflict-related security measures would extend outside of the disaster area. 
The IFRC argues that Article 59 of the fourth Geneva Convention, 70 and 71 of 
the First Additional Protocol, and 18 of the Second Additional Protocol refer to 
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“situations of ‘inadequate supply’ without any requirement that any shortages be directly 
attributable to fighting,” which apply in mixed conflict and disaster situations.141 The 
IFRC argues that the impacts of the conflict are ongoing despite the disaster. Therefore, 
humanitarian aid can be given under the same rules in disaster as in conflict. David 
Fisher, the senior legal research officer for the IFRC, argues that in mixed conflict and 
disaster settings it is clear IHL is applicable. He argues that the triggers for IHL are 
related to the needs of the civilian population due to lack of “necessary” supplies.142 The 
articles in the Geneva Conventions do not call out a particular cause for the needs, to 
which Fisher responds, “An interpretation of the ordinary meanings of these texts would 
lead to the conclusion that the need for relief might be attributable to natural forces rather 
than ongoing fighting does not change the parties’ obligations concerning relief in a 
conflict setting.”143 
Application of these regulations assumes that the government considers a) the 
conflict falls under IHL as a NIAC, and b) the conflict continues during the disaster 
response. However, in the Sri Lanka and Indonesia case studies, a ceasefire was initially 
called, indicating that the provision of aid could proceed unimpeded by conflict-related 
security issues. The government and the armed groups later continued attacks on each 
other in both countries, with the LTTE committing inter-factional attacks in the Northern 
and Eastern Provinces. In Pakistan, the government claimed it was conducting “law 
enforcement operations.” If there is no recognized conflict, then IHL would no longer be 
applicable, and the state can respond as it sees fit.  
To further examine how the issues of conflict impact disaster response, this thesis 
analyzes the responses in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. Each case study is divided 
into six sections: 
• Relationship to U.S. counterterrorism efforts—This section describes the 
role of the country in U.S counterterrorism efforts. 
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• Conflict background—This section provides background information on 
the government and armed groups’ actions, how humanitarian aid was 
viewed, and the role of the Red Cross Movement during the conflict 
before the disaster. 
• Incident situation—This section describes the response environment, the 
status of the government, and the government entities in charge of the 
response. 
• Security situation—This section describes the security environment and its 
impacts on NGO and Red Cross Movement response. 
• Logistical and resource issues—This section describes how the disaster 
impacted transportation routes and how the regulatory and security 
restrictions on resources affected NGOs and the Red Cross Movement 
during the response. 
• ICRC and RCRC Society Operations—This section describes the Red 
Cross Movement’s provision of aid during the disaster response based on 
reports written by both the ICRC and the IFRC.  
The first four sections show how the military and political situations impact the disaster 
response. The fifth and six sections address the resulting hindrances of the political and 
military situation. The Indonesia case study contains an additional section to account for 
the perception of NGOs and foreign militaries. 
The first and second case studies (which are both responses to the 2004 Indian 
Ocean tsunami) happened a year after the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan began and 
four years after the Global War on Terror declaration. While they are the same incident, 
the responses and outcomes of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami varied between Indonesia 
and Sri Lanka and are thus presented separately. The third case occurred six years later in 
Pakistan, after several changes in policy and legislation regarding humanitarian response 
in conflicts and disaster. All three countries received funding for counterterrorism 




A. CASE STUDIES 1 AND 2: 2004 INDIAN OCEAN TSUNAMI  
These two case studies focus on the response in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. Both 
countries had strong established government structures at the time of the tsunami, which 
allowed for coordinated efforts in the conflicts. Both countries are also considered a part 
of the “second front” in the war on terror.144 Since the September 11th attacks, the 
United States has seen Southeast Asia as a necessary partner in the war on terror; 
particular focus after the tsunami in Indonesia—the largest country in the region—was on 
stability.145 
B. CASE STUDY 1: INDONESIA  
1. Relationship to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts 
When the war on terror was declared, U.S. relations with Indonesia were revived 
to curb terrorist groups in Southeast Asia. The United States had suspended funding for 
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which trained in 
order to increase professionalism, respect for democratic values and human rights, and 
“cement Indonesia’s cooperation with the U.S. military” because of concerns over human 
rights violations committed by the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) in East Timor.146 In 
2002, Jemaah Islamiya (JI), based in Indonesia, successfully committed bombings in Bali 
that killed 202 Australian tourists. The group was discovered when Singaporean 
authorities uncovered a cell plotting to attack targets associated with the U.S. Navy in 
2002 and were designated as terrorists by the United States on October 23, 2002.147 
Indonesia became a partner in the fight against terrorism after the Bali bombings. The 
government enacted anti-terrorism laws that were considered to retroactively take effect 
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prior to the Bali bombings, allowing the government to prosecute the perpetrators.148 In 
2002, the United States provided the Indonesian government funding to create a special 
counterterrorism police force called SD 88, and the IMET funding was provided again.149 
2. Conflict Background 
By the time of the tsunami, the conflict between the Indonesian government and 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), a group fighting for an independent Aceh province, had 
been raging for roughly 30 years. At its height, GAM held 70 percent of Aceh. In May of 
2003, the government declared martial law and evacuated Aceh.150 The military 
operation that followed, “Integrated Operation,” was twofold: it involved both security 
operations and humanitarian operations.151 The security operations were determined to 
“crush” the GAM movement, and the humanitarian operations were to care for the IDPs 
in camps.152 The government insisted that evacuations were necessary to separate GAM 
fighters from the civilian population and it was a humanitarian operation to keep civilians 
safe.153 The military (TNI) parachuted into villages and reportedly forced civilians to 
evacuate without preparation; if they refused, they were told that they would be 
considered GAM supporters and treated as such.154 GAM during this period was also 
responsible for forced displacement through attacks and threats.155  
The Indonesian Red Cross, or Palang Merah Indonesia (PMI), and the ICRC 
issued a joint statement that urged the government to adhere to IHL and the Geneva 
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Conventions.156 The TNI invited the ICRC and PMI to train soldiers on IHL a month 
after the declaration of martial law. The ICRC and PMI also evacuated the dead and 
wounded from the camps and, out of respect for the principles of neutrality and 
impartiality, the victims’ status and identification were kept confidential.157 However, 
Indonesian and foreign NGOs faced limitations outlined in Presidential Decision No. 
43/2003, which banned any actions that ran counter to the martial law administration and 
required all actions to go through the Coordinating Minister for People’s Welfare.158 
3. Incident Situation 
The hardest-hit area was Aceh, a 21,000-square-mile province on the northern tip 
of Sumatra with a population of 4.5 million.159 The U.S. Geological Survey reported that, 
in Aceh and Sumatera Utara Provinces, 108,000 people were killed, 127,000 were 
missing, and 427,000 were displaced.160 Of the 427,000 displaced, the IFRC reported 
that 127,000 or more IDPs required shelter, with few suitable sites to set up shelters and 
sanitary facilities. Seaports, major roads, and bridges to and from the main cities of 
Medan and Banda Aceh as well as along the coast were destroyed. Airports were either 
destroyed or operating at severely reduced capacity. Local government officials, many of 
whom had been killed or had lost family and their homes in the tsunami, were unable to 
provide support to the population.161 
At the time, Indonesia’s National Coordinating Body for Disaster Management 
(Bakornas) had no assets, policies, or implementation and enforcement capabilities.162 
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The situation caused the government of Indonesia to allow foreign entities to respond. 
The TNI reported that 14 UN agencies, 16 foreign militaries, and 195 foreign 
humanitarian groups provided relief operations in Aceh alone.163 The TNI assumed 
control of the overall response, ran operations, and served as the foreign military and 
USAID point of contact. The government asked the UN to coordinate the foreign NGOs. 
In Medan, the UN would report and coordinate NGO operations with the Australian 
Defense Force and TNI.164 Foreign militaries were only allowed to conduct operations 
for three months and only in areas allowed by the TNI. Restriction of NGOs imposed 
during the conflict continued for security reasons. 
4. Security Situation 
Days after the tsunami, GAM and the government agreed to a ceasefire. With the 
ceasefire, IHL no longer applied, even under the ICRC interpretation of Article 59 of the 
fourth Geneva Convention, 70 and 71 of the First Additional Protocol, and 18 of the 
Second Additional Protocol. However, fighting did not end. The government has since 
admitted to continuing counterinsurgency efforts despite the ceasefire.165 The state-run 
news agency ran quotes from the army chief of staff declaring that at least 120 rebels had 
been killed shortly after the tsunami.166 GAM fighters were not innocent in the attacks; 
they were reportedly violating the ceasefire as well. 
Refugee camps posed a potential threat as well. An American civil–military office 
stated, “Restless refugee camp males are the prime breeding ground of some of these 
insurgencies.”167 Refugee camps were a concern in the war on terror due to the arrival of 
the Laskar Mujahidin—a part of the Mujahedeen Council of Indonesia (MMI), and 
previously headed by the former leader of JI.168 The MMI has been considered a front 
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for JI.169 It was alleged that the groups were brought in to help the TNI hold GAM at bay 
through ongoing counterinsurgency efforts. The TNI provided air transport, provisions, 
and housing for MMI responders, which raised questions as to the relationship between 
TNI and JI.170 There was also evidence that the MMI was handing out recruiting leaflets 
in the camps. 
Throughout the response, the government and the TNI would continue to restrict 
both foreign military and humanitarian access to the areas outside of cities for security 
reasons. Despite GAM claiming a ceasefire, the TNI claimed that the restrictions were for 
the safety of the aid workers and would prevent supplies from falling into the hands of 
GAM.171 In some cases, it was reported that the TNI insisted upon delivering relief 
supplies and barred local NGOs from providing aid.172 There were safety concerns for 
aid workers. The IFRC reported that a Red Cross delegate was shot seven months into the 
response.173 The principles of neutrality should ensure that even GAM fighters would 
receive supplies, but once again the TNI’s objective was to ensure that did not happen.  
Aid workers, to include those with the ICRC, had to apply for permission to leave 
designated areas and were required to have military escorts. The multitude of NGOs that 
entered the country was difficult to manage, and competition between NGOs to get aid to 
everyone made coordination that much harder.174 Given the actions of the TNI before the 
tsunami, NGOs traveling with military escorts could give the perception of NGOs’ 
collusion with the government, causing security problems for aid workers when dealing 
with GAM or the population most impacted by the conflict. On the other hand, the 
absence of local government officials and GAM’s actions complicated the organization 
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of security and relief efforts in some areas. The U.S. military had to halt operations due to 
threats from GAM fighters, and NGOs reported attacks on their workers. 
5. Perception of NGOs and Foreign Militaries 
U.S. and Australian forces and NGOs were reminded they should not try to do 
anything beyond humanitarian aid work. The Indonesian government, GAM, JI, Laskar 
Mujahidin, and the public expressed tentative trust of U.S. involvement. There were 
concerns that military forces and NGOs were there to invade and promote Christianity in 
the largely Muslim country. A member of Laskar Mujahidin stated, “As long as [foreign 
troops] are here to help, we will have no problem with them.”175 Hilmy Bakar 
Almascaty, the head of GAM, added, “So far, America has come here like an angel, but if 
it turns into a Satan as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq, we must fight it.”176 The head of 
the Indonesian legislative body stated that if America and Australia were to act beyond 
their humanitarian aid role, “then we have to resist.”177 The targeting of America and 
Australia despite fourteen other foreign militaries responding could be an extension of the 
previous threats on the response from the U.S. Navy and the Bali bombing, both 
committed by JI. The U.S. Navy based operations off the coast of Aceh, per the 
government’s direction. However, the Navy provided escorts for NGOs and helped to set 
up a management information center to aid in information sharing among themselves and 
the military.178  
The fear of NGOs proselytizing Muslims to convert to Christianity was also a 
concern. This situation highlights the perception that NGOs promote Western Judeo–
Christian values rather than accepting the beliefs of the local culture. The secretary 
general of the Indonesian Council of Ulemas warned all “nongovernmental organizations, 
either domestic or international, with hidden agendas coming here with humanitarian 
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purposes but instead proselytizing, this is what we do not like.”179 The actions of some of 
the NGOs did not allay those fears; a Christian NGO proclaimed it would take in orphan 
children and place them in Christian homes.180 The secretary general of the Indonesian 
Council of Ulemas condemned these actions, and the NGO abandoned the idea when the 
population protested, realizing the government had banned the adoption of orphaned 
Acehnese by non-Muslims.181 Some aid workers reportedly distributed Bibles despite the 
government’s concerns over proselytizing.182 The article does not mention if Christian 
groups were only handing out Bibles to Christians that reside in the area, but given the 
concerns expressed by the government, it may not have mattered. The UK newspaper the 
Guardian reported American Evangelist Mark Kosinski as stating, “These people need 
food, but they also need Jesus. God is trying to awaken people and help them realise 
salvation is in Christ”183 The Guardian article did end noting that Mormon and 
Indonesian Christian groups were working with Islamic relief workers to remove corpses 
and provide relief supplies.  
NGOs were inconsistent in their approaches with the military, sometimes 
resulting in tense relations. NGOs did not always follow standard principles of neutrality 
and provided uneven quality and, at times, inappropriate supplies.184 NGOs that had not 
worked in the country before had trouble translating unclear and inconsistent government 
regulations.185 
6. Overall Logistical and Resource Issues 
The response to the earthquake and tsunami resulted in a glut of responders that 
caused significant logistical issues. The government restricted response efforts by foreign 
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militaries to three months. The large-scale response combined with the heavily impacted 
infrastructure led to operational and logistical issues. Before the tsunami, the Banda Aceh 
airport on average handled eight flights a day. After the tsunami, the airport was the only 
partially functional airport that could accommodate large fixed wing planes and would 
have to support 132 flights a day to accommodate the aid resources.186 Flights had to 
land, unload aid supplies on the tarmac, and fly out. Medan was the main staging area for 
resources. However, the remaining structures did not provide enough storage capabilities 
and were quickly overwhelmed. Ongoing conflict reportedly held up relief convoys for 
hours.187 The government originally under-regulated NGOs and then over-regulated to 
compensate.188 For the responders, there were significant bureaucratic bottlenecks in 
getting visas for incoming volunteers. 
7. ICRC and Palang Merah Indonesia (Indonesian Red Cross Society) 
Operations  
The chairman of PMI traveled with the Indonesian vice president as an advisor 
about the impacted area for the initial assessment of damage. The ICRC had limited 
travel despite consistent access to GAM and IDP camps during the conflict, but the PMI 
was allowed outside the main cities without military escorts. This relationship also 
allowed the ICRC and the PMI to receive resources without as many issues as the other 
groups. According to the IFRC, GAM also continued attacks. However, the IFRC report 
did not speak to the military’s ongoing counterinsurgency efforts. 
The Red Cross Movement was not immune to the corruption of response efforts. 
In April 2005, the Red Cross Movement issued a security policy due to an increase in 
corruption and threats to personnel during the reconstruction period. The policy 
acknowledged that contractors involved in reconstruction efforts were being threatened 
and felt it was better to pay the government officials than lose their lives.189 The IFRC 
Stay Safe manual provides a brief vignette that tells of two national societies being 
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threatened by alleged rebels who demanded the Societies pay taxes to finish their 
programs. The Societies suspended activities and informed the local community that 
programs would not resume unless the threats stopped. The local community began 
policing the groups and programs resumed. This vignette highlights the issues that 
humanitarian agencies face when responding to conflict and disaster. The workers faced 
threats and demanded the government or community deal with those threatening them. 
Otherwise, they would have to stop work.190 If these threats continued, then the 
vulnerable population would have lost aid and it would reinforce the idea that they were 
in league with the government and the Western responders.   
C. CASE STUDY 2: SRI LANKA 
1. Relationships to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts 
By the time of the tsunami, the conflict between the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GoSL) and the LTTE group fighting for an independent Tamil province in the north and 
east of the country had been raging for 21 years. The United States designated the LTTE 
a terrorist group in 1997. The LTTE’s reach was beyond Sri Lanka; Tamils in India, 
Australia, Canada, Switzerland, and other countries provided financial support the LTTE 
and their Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), as well as other charitable 
organizations.191 The United States froze the TRO’s assets under counterterrorism 
legislation.192 In addition, they funded themselves through legitimate and illegitimate 
businesses in Colombo, as well as by smuggling guns to other armed groups.193 They had 
an established government and military to include a navy and army, which held a large 
portion in the north and east of the country. 
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2. Conflict Background 
As in Indonesia, the GoSL treated the conflict as a domestic terrorist issue, 
insisting that the government is permitted to respond in accordance with its own laws.194 
In 2002, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed their first ceasefire; following 
the ceasefire was an influx of NGOs into the area. NGOs were focused on reconstruction 
efforts. However, the GoSL considered their actions, specifically with the LTTE, to be 
undermining the sovereignty of the government.195  
Before the tsunami, the ICRC was heavily involved in the Vanni area, working 
with the LTTE proto-government since 1989. NGOs working in that area had been 
considered pro-LTTE. However, the UN and ICRC received less criticism than others.196 
The ICRC maintained a good relationship with the Sri Lankan government due to their 
work negotiating the release of prisoners of war.197 They also worked to provide better 
healthcare, water supply, and economic security, and to ensure the safe passage of 
civilians in and out of the LTTE-held area of Vanni.198 Sri Lanka was divided among 
three major ethnicities, the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the Muslim population. The GoSL 
had been leveraging the divides to favor groups to create a blockade against the LTTE—
in particular, the provision of water.199 They had also begun moving toward restrictions 
of movement, to include establishing permits, checkpoints, and “closed military 
zones.”200 
Despite the opposition to the LTTE’s methods, the ICRC projects and the GoSL-
imposed restrictions helped garner support for the group.201 In 2004, the leader of the 
LTTE faction in the Eastern Province, Colonel Karuna, had recently switched sides to 
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support the GoSL, which limited the LTTE’s ability to carry out military actions, 
fundraising, and recruitment in the Batticaloa District.202 In the Eastern Province the 
majority of NGOs were run by Tamils, and in 1999 were considered partisan among the 
Sinhalese and Muslim communities.203 At the time, the government had frozen the assets 
of NGOs in the Northern Province due to concern over their links to the LTTE.204 
3. Incident Situation 
Prior to the tsunami, there were an estimated 390,000 IDPs due to the conflict, 
primarily Tamils in the north and east of the country.205 The population distribution of 
the country at the time was 74 percent Sinhalese, 18 percent Tamil, and 7 percent 
Muslim.206 The tsunami impacted 61 percent of Sinhalese population in the south, with 
the Tamils at 21 percent and Muslims at 17 percent in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces.207 Surveys in the Eastern Province showed areas with higher concentrations of 
Tamils already impacted by the conflict had, in comparison, higher death rates and more 
damaged or destroyed homes than others.208 Tamils in these areas also had a 
socioeconomic disadvantage compared to Muslims, with living standards below average 
for the area.209 This meant that Tamils were the most vulnerable of the impacted 
survivors; however, aid efforts for the Tamils were some of the most politically 
contested.  
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In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the citizens themselves were the first 
responders, showing no regard for ethnicity. Their actions are credited with a successful 
response operation that lessened the risk of endemic disease and food shortages.210 In the 
beginning of the response, local governments were in charge of response coordination 
activities through district secretariats and in coordination with established NGOs.211 
Requests for aid were immediate; while there were no comprehensive plans for a large-
scale incident, the secretariats established inter-sectoral coordination led by a government 
agent who communicated with other districts and the national government. The disaster 
management legislation had not been passed, leaving the government with no formal 
mechanism to provide disaster relief.212 Within the first week of the disaster aftermath, 
1,500 American troops were deployed around Sri Lanka to provide relief—primarily in 
the south, to avoid the LTTE strongholds in the north.213 Over the course of the response, 
recovery, and reconstruction period, 2,000 NGOs operated in Sri Lanka.214 
Three days after the tsunami, the government established the Centre for National 
Operations, which was responsible for the coordination of state response, to include the 
direction of NGO activities to the areas in most need. Nine days into the response, the 
GoSL declared a state of emergency in the interest of public security. In doing so, the 
president and military were placed in charge of the response efforts and temporarily 
suspended separation of powers. This action caused the Human Rights Commission of 
Sri Lanka to express concern that a prolonged state of emergency may result in large-
scale human rights violations.215 The coordination structures would change over the 
course of the response.  
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4. Security Situation 
The majority of Sri Lanka’s security issues occurred during the recovery and 
reconstruction phases of the response. From the beginning, though, a main concern of the 
GoSL was aid efforts in the LTTE-held areas. The LTTE and GoSL peace talks had 
reached a low point by the time the tsunami hit. As in Indonesia, the two agreed to a 
ceasefire and even agreed to collaborate on disaster response. There were indications that 
humanitarian aid was used for political capital by both the government and the LTTE to 
sway constituents.216 Early on, the GoSL and LTTE agreed to collaborate on the 
distribution of aid. A UN report on NGO coordination and response in Sri Lanka, the 
Maldives, and Indonesia stated that aid efforts in LTTE areas led to political dissent, 
which in turn led to the demise of government and LTTE collaboration efforts.217 Despite 
the collaboration attempts, there was still a strong sense among the Tamils that the GoSL 
assistance was biased. As previously mentioned, the tsunami impacted a large portion of 
Sinhalese in the south, but the Tamils and the Muslims in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces were more vulnerable since they had sustained impacts from both the conflict 
and the disaster. The percentage of Tamil and Muslim deaths was also more significant 
than those in the south because the death rate was high and the population was small prior 
to the tsunami. 
Impacts from the tsunami were compounded in the northern area due to 
destruction and isolation caused by the ongoing conflict.218 In the first days of the 
tsunami, the LTTE and GoSL were able to collaborate to respond. However, this 
collaboration did not hold. Both the LTTE and the GoSL engaged in public relations 
fights, with each claiming that the other was exploiting the tsunami response. According 
to a report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, several sources reported 
that LTTE-controlled areas were not receiving aid, while other reports stated the LTTE 
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would not allow foreign aid workers into the area.219 Days after the tsunami, the LTTE 
invited media into areas under its control to demonstrate the struggles of the Tamils.220 
They also invited UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to see the damage, but the GoSL 
canceled the visit.221  
Most reports highlight inequalities in assistance distribution, but do not provide 
information on all the factors that play into providing financial assistance. A study for the 
UN shows a significant difference in spending per house, but the study does not appear to 
factor in death rates relative to the spending.222 If a large portion of Tamils were killed, 
then financial assistance needs would be lower; financial assistance for a family of four 
survivors in the Southern Province would cost more than for an individual survivor who 
lost his or her family in the Eastern or Northern Province. There would also be no need to 
build houses for families that no longer existed; therefore reconstruction costs would be 
lower in those areas. Orphaned children were also moved into camps, which further 
reduced the amount of financial assistance required for those areas. An audit by the 
auditor general did show that the government’s misappropriation of funds led to large 
portions of unspent aid.223 
In January 2005, the GoSL, the Muslim community, and the LTTE negotiated an 
agreement establishing a plan for recovery and reconstruction assistance. The agreement, 
completed in June 2005 and entitled “Post-tsunami Operations Management Structure” 
(P-TOMS), set up a national, regional, and district-level structure that would oversee 
distribution of assistance and a fund that would be accessible to both the LTTE and 
Muslim community for recovery and reconstruction efforts. The IFRC reported that, 
while the recovery and reconstruction only pertained to the tsunami-affected areas, there 
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was hope that the agreement would help toward the revival of peace talks.224 P-TOMS 
created significant political strife and was protested by political groups; it was ruled 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court shortly after the agreement was approved. 
According to the IFRC, this was a damaging setback that slowed reconstruction efforts, 
caused a renewal of violence, and pressured aid agencies to redirect efforts to the 
increasing number of IDPs that would not have homes any time soon.225 
By the summer of 2005, reconstruction and recovery activities were slowed due to 
increasing violence and political killings. In August 2005, the GoSL declared a state of 
emergency following the assassination of the Sri Lankan president. Amnesty 
International reported that killings of civilians had begun to increase by December of 
2005. The killings were not attributed solely to the LTTE, but also to Colonel Karuna’s 
group Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) in the Eastern Province, other Tamil 
armed groups, and government security forces.226 Interviews conducted by Amnesty 
International related killings to the split between the northern LTTE and the TMVP as a 
means to “settle grudges,” leading to more instability in the tsunami-affected areas. There 
were reports of sexual abuse of women and kidnapping of children in camps. The ICRC 
reported that the recruitment of minors continued in 2005, and the GoSL halted adoptions 
due to the UN’s inclinations that “gang-related” kidnappings were occurring.227 Security 
forces were unable to secure camps in the north and east due to attacks. The Deputy 
Inspector General of Police, Eastern Range, told Amnesty International that armed 
groups were attacking security forces in camps, leading to a reduction in forces to secure 
camps. The camps were still populated in 2006, with very little relief in sight. 
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5. Overall Logistical and Resource Issues 
There were approximately 2,000 local and international NGOs in Sri Lanka 
throughout the course of the response and recovery. In addition to the Centre for National 
Operations, the government founded the Task Force for Logistics Law and Order. The 
Task Force’s duties were to ensure easy access to relief supplies and coordinate with 
customs and immigrations authorities for secure storage and distribution of relief 
supplies. The Task Force was also responsible for the protection of survivors of 
harassment and exploitation.  
Impacts from the tsunami were compounded in the northern area of Vanni due to 
destruction and isolation caused by the ongoing conflict.228 Prior to the tsunami, the Sri 
Lankan government had won back Jaffna, a major city on the northern tip of the island. 
The LTTE, however, had maintained control of the Vanni area. There were two 
checkpoints into the area. Both the GoSL and the LTTE asked for ICRC presence at 
checkpoints to facilitate movement of resources to and from the area.229 The operating 
hours were extended to allow relief items to reach survivors. Relief supplies going to this 
area had to be offloaded, thoroughly inspected, and valued twice by the government. If 
supplies were sent directly into the area without distribution orders from the capital, the 
Sri Lanka navy and air force would inspect them. 
Only a few of the hundreds of responding NGOs in Sri Lanka had previously 
worked and were registered in the country. Outside NGOs faced challenges and delays in 
getting visas for both staff and resources into the country. NGOs that had worked in the 
country prior to the tsunami were able to negotiate concessions on taxes, duties, and 
customs procedures. Other NGOs were able to negotiate, but with difficulties; it was 
reported that the Ministry of Finance discouraged new memorandums of understanding 
that included tax, duty, and immunity concessions.230 The concessions did not 
necessarily result in an easier process, but some relief items were considered exempt 
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from waivers. In some cases waivers were issued for supplies, but only if the supplies 
were handed over to the government for distribution.231 
The customs searches—deemed necessary by the GoSL due to security 
concerns—were a cause of lengthy delays that often resulted in supplies expiring or no 
longer being needed. There were reports that individuals or groups registered as 
fraudulent NGOs to import non-relief items (e.g., drugs, ammunition, and grenades) 
mixed in with relief supplies.232 NGOs also knowingly mislabeled cargo to avoid taxes 
and duty fees. In addition, there were reports that organizations tried to import helicopters 
and items for commercial sale that were not relief items.233 Communications equipment 
deliveries to allow for cell and radio capabilities were blocked in conflict areas because 
the government claimed the technology was military grade and therefore posed a security 
risk.234 This issue applied equally to organizations that had previously worked with the 
GoSL and new organizations.235 The GoSL leveraged new taxes on relief supplies in the 
hopes of curbing fraud.236 
6. ICRC and RCRC Society Operations 
The Red Cross Movement had a heavy presence and a good relationship with both 
the LTTE and GoSL in Sri Lanka. More than 70 National Red Cross Societies 
contributed, 20 worked in country operations, and 16 of those worked in the north and 
east.237 The ICRC coordinated efforts in the north and east, working with the GoSL, 
LTTE, and other NGOs. As the lead relief entity, the ICRC handled security issues and 
communication with authorities.238 The ICRC provided healthcare and water sanitation 
in isolated areas, as well as seeds and tools to communities to alleviate the economic 
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impacts of the tsunami on farmers.239 As previously mentioned, the ICRC ensured the 
facilitation of relief supply distribution through the checkpoints. They also worked with 
the Sri Lankan Red Cross and four other national societies to develop a long-term plan 
for recovery and reconstruction.240 The ICRC worked on tsunami-related issues in the 
north and east until mid-2005, before switching back to its conflict-related 
responsibilities (e.g., negotiating the release of minors by the LTTE, prisoner visits, and 
IHL training) full time.241 The Sri Lankan Red Cross took over coordination of tsunami-
related activities in these areas.  
D. CASE STUDIES 1 AND 2: CONCLUSION 
Both countries lacked plans to handle a catastrophic incident, much less an 
incident that could occur during a conflict. This left the governments vulnerable and 
reliant upon the international community. The TNI in Indonesia faced the challenge of 
working with an international community that had criticized the government for human 
rights violations and had previously been kicked out of the country. It had also restricted 
NGOs previously, and the GoSL had worked out a balance with the Sri Lankan Red 
Cross and the ICRC. This was thrown by the influx of foreign militaries and NGOs. 
Without plans to account for these shifts, the government had to scramble to maintain 
control; it had to address the challenge of responding without allowing the armed groups 
to use the situation to their benefit.    
The overwhelming influx of NGOs into both countries not only created logistical 
issues, but also taxed the governments’ control even more. Even without a conflict, this 
would have hindered NGO responses; because of damaged infrastructure and the amount 
of relief supplies coming in, the logistics would have been overwhelming. The influx of 
NGOs and the lack of a plan led to ad hoc laws and taxes that even the NGOs that had 
existing relationships with the government found difficult to navigate. Poor NGO 





coordination and communication issues led to multiple approaches to response efforts. 
The multiple approaches caused perception issues for NGOs across the board. 
Corruption of aid occurred in both countries, and aid workers found themselves in 
danger. In both countries, foreign militaries had advantages in their ability to provide 
assessments and logistic capabilities. There were issues with information sharing, 
coordination, and communications between the NGOs and the military, but the 
advantages of the military seemed to outweigh those issues. The U.S. Navy responded to 
both countries, but the responses were different. Indonesian response aid delivery did not 
involve response in an area with a U.S.-designated terrorist group, as it did in Sri Lanka. 
In Indonesia, a group that was a suspected front for a U.S.-designated terrorist group 
provided aid in Banda Aceh in coordination with the U.S. NGOs and the Navy. In Sri 
Lanka, the U.S. Navy provided support to the country, but not in the areas held by the 
LTTE, a U.S.-designated terrorist group.242 
The response efforts within Indonesia and Sri Lanka had some differences. It 
would appear that the restriction of humanitarian aid organizations was a benefit in 
Indonesia. The conflict between the government and the GAM did not resume following 
the tsunami. By the ICRC’s definition of the end of a NIAC, the result of the tsunami 
response was the end of the NIAC. Response conducted by foreign militaries was closely 
coordinated with the TNI. In addition, the militaries had similar mission sets beyond 
tsunami response, to ensure counterterrorism efforts were successful. The TNI treated the 
response more as an extension of the conflict and, due to the previous actions to restrict 
NGOs, was able to maintain status quo despite opening the country up to international 
aid. It was believed that the TNI was able to coordinate both response and 
counterinsurgency efforts effectively despite restricting NGOs. For security reasons, the 
PMI and ICRC’s actions were tied to political objectives rather than the principles of 
neutrality and independence. 
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In Sri Lanka, humanitarian aid was allowed to continue in all areas without many 
restrictions imposed by the GoSL. The GoSL and the LTTE made a concerted effort to 
collaborate in the beginning, but political dissent and inter-factional fighting caused the 
collaboration to dissipate and the conflict resumed and intensified. Unlike GAM, the 
LTTE was well funded and organized, with well-established control of territory that had 
strategic advantage prior to the tsunami. The split of the TMVP from the LTTE added a 
new factor to the conflict just before the tsunami and caused fighting over resources. The 
northern faction of the LTTE lost its main source of child recruits after the break and the 
tsunami overwhelmingly impacted children, causing a reduction in fighting forces. 
Exploitation of the situation through kidnappings from camps compounded the issues, as 
did the GoSL’s party division on how to deal with the situation. In this case, the ICRC 
was able to continue its conflict-related activities, and its principles were not 
compromised by the disaster response as much as in Indonesia.  
E. CASE STUDY 3: 2010 FLOODS—PAKISTAN  
1. Relationship to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts 
Pakistan is considered a central actor in the war on terror’s goals—fighting 
terrorism and religious militancy, creating stability in Afghanistan, and ensuring nuclear 
non-proliferation in the area.243 The country faces a complex insurgency in a complex 
network of armed groups that operate under the banner of the Taliban Movement of 
Pakistan as well as various other groups in different parts of the country.244 While 
Pakistan has withstood multiple natural disasters, this disaster was worse than all those 
before and threatened the gains the Government of Pakistan (GoP) had made in the 
contested areas. A stable Pakistan was considered a strategic goal in U.S. 
counterterrorism efforts.245 The scale of this incident exceeded most local actors’ 
(humanitarian and government) abilities and tested the GoP’s ability to stabilize the 
country. There was international pressure on the GoP to maintain security and an 
                                                 
243 Kronstadt, Sheikh, and Vaughn, Flooding in Pakistan. 
244 C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan in 2010: Flooding, Governmental Inefficiency, and Continued 
Insurgency,” Asian Survey 51, no. 1 (2011), doi: AS.2011.51.1.97. 
245 Kronstadt, Sheikh, and Vaughn, Flooding in Pakistan. 
 66 
effective response to maintain goodwill in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).246 
2. Conflict Background 
Fighting between the Pakistani armed forces and armed groups in KP and the 
FATA since the 2001 invasion has led to a large-scale IDP situation. People displaced 
from fighting in 2009 had returned, but fighting continued in the FATA and KP in the 
form of armed group attacks against civilians, the army, and the police. The role of 
international NGOs is not defined, and they were not able to provide aid in “politically 
sensitive” areas during the conflict.247 Following the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the 
ICRC’s primary role had been focused on aiding refugees from Afghanistan that were in 
camps on the Pakistan–Afghanistan border.248 The ICRC had not been conducting 
operations in KP or the FATA as they were considered inaccessible. The Taliban 
Movement of Pakistan saw NGOs as a part of a Western agenda and rejected 
assistance.249 
An earthquake impacted the area in 2005, killing or injuring 145,000 people and 
leaving 3.5 million homeless.250 The military coordinated efforts, and the response was 
considered one of the most successful responses to a large-scale incident. Civil–military 
relationships, despite several issues, were also considered a success. Concerns over 
cooperating with the military and counterterrorism efforts were set aside for the response. 
There were reports of “banned jihadi groups,” and “charitable wings of prominent 
religious parties” being active in response to gain influence over the population.251 
As the conflict continued, civil–military relations began to break down due to the 
worsening security situation and geopolitical changes. In 2008, military operations 
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displaced another 500,000 people from the FATA; NGOs and the ICRC began expanding 
operations into the FATA, Swat, Karachi, and Lahore.252 The military avoided calling the 
operations “conflicts,” which would tie them to the Geneva Conventions and IHL, 
characterizing them as “law enforcement operations.” This gave the military the ability to 
control and restrict humanitarian operations.253 In May 2009, the military conducted 
operations in the Swat region. Despite repeatedly winning the battle but failing to hold 
the area, leading to low civilian confidence in the military, law and order was restored to 
the region.254 Civilians who had fled returned to the area by July 2010.  
The government initially downplayed the IDP situation and was slow to react to 
the humanitarian implications. According to an assessment by the Humanitarian Policy 
Group, the conduct of the operations created a “clash of principles” for humanitarian 
groups.255 The assessment argues that NGOs failed to speak out against the “conduct of 
hostilities and the politicisation of the emergency response” during the operation.256 The 
UN, which was attempting to build a stronger relationship with Pakistan, was quiet on the 
subject of violations. The ICRC promoted IHL with the government and, according to 
their reports, repeatedly emphasized that they abide by the principles of neutrality, 
independence, and impartiality. Regardless, they were restricted from certain areas for 
security reasons; the ICRC abided by these restrictions, undermining its claims. 
3. Incident Situation 
Flooding began in July in the KP and Balochistan area, where conflict and the 
majority of the displacement occurred. Then flooding continued downstream into the 
Sindh and Punjab areas, flooding a fifth of the country—an area larger than England.257 
At the time of the floods there were nearly 2 million IDPs in Pakistan due to security 
operations. The flooding impacted 20 million people in 84 of the 121 districts, killing 
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2,000 people and destroying or severely damaging 1.3 million homes. The flooding 
affected critical infrastructure and 80 percent of the food reserves, and destroyed farming 
communities.258 This caused food prices to surge for the entire country. There was a loss 
of access to clean water, homes, and sanitation facilities. The incident compounded the 
IDP situation by not only impacting the camps, but also hindering the return of IDPs to 
their homes which, in many cases, no longer existed. 
The GoP did not request assistance until September, a month after the flooding 
began. There were conflicts regarding assessments of the damage; the government 
initially downplayed the damage while international NGOs and the UN reported a large-
scale disaster.259 The government criticized these assessments because NGOs failed to 
sync their assessments to the state assessments, or among themselves, before 
publishing.260 The response was organized from Islamabad by the National Disaster 
Management Agency (NDMA), a civilian agency led by General Nadeem Ahmed, a 
senior military figure.261 The military was once again the GoP’s primary provider of 
disaster response. However, due to the severity of the disaster, the system was 
overwhelmed and led to the largest aid response in Pakistani history. This disaster did not 
represent just a catastrophic event for the civilians, but, as some analysts proclaimed, a 
test of the GoP’s durability. A Congressional Research Service report points out that, “in 
the view of some analysts, the aggregated pressures are so great that the current national 
government is seen as unlikely to survive and complete its five-year term set to end in the 
spring of 2013.”262 
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4. Security Situation 
The international community had concerns that the flooding would allow the 
armed groups to regroup after attacks by the Pakistani military. By August, 60,000 troops 
were redeployed to conduct disaster response operations. Attacks by the armed groups 
and counterinsurgency efforts by the military, despite the diversion of troops, continued. 
The deputy commander of the U.S. Department of Defense representative in Pakistan 
stated that he had confidence the GoP would “continue to wage a dedicated, committed 
struggle against violent extremism.”263 Another senior military official stated that the 
flooding had delayed the timetable for operations by both the military and the armed 
groups.264 
Goodwill and coordination between the Pakistan military and NGOs eroded 
following the 2005 earthquake.265 Pakistani authorities and organizations, some UN 
agencies, and international NGOs saw the response as simply a natural disaster rather 
than a complex emergency. The ICRC, on the other hand, viewed the response as a 
disaster in the midst of conflict. This led to a divergence in response operation conduct. 
The ICRC reported that military operations, security restrictions, and attacks by armed 
groups in KP and the FATA hindered humanitarian operations by delaying operations or 
leading to the cancellation of some activities.266 The report also mentions several times 
that the Pakistani Red Crescent Society (PRCS) and the ICRC had to enforce their 
operating principles. Pakistani authorities strongly encouraged the use of armed escorts in 
parts of the KP, Punjab, and Sindh districts. Some NGOs accepted the escorts, others 
obtained exceptions, and others canceled activities in those areas. NGOs were concerned 
working with the military and police in those areas would cause perception issues that 
would put NGO staff at risk. The GoP had concerns that an attack on an NGO would give 
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the perception they could not handle security concerns and insisted that NGOs have 
police escorts in sensitive areas.267 
Relief projects and travel to the FATA and KP required no-objection certificates, 
which serve as proof of authorization by the government to travel and conduct project-
related activities. National authorities understood humanitarian security strategies but did 
not adequately communicate with Punjab and parts of the KP districts, creating confusion 
at the field and local levels. There was confusion over the need for no-objection 
certificates and the insistence on the use of armed escorts, and nervousness over allowing 
expatriate staff to provide aid.268 The media reported that charities affiliated with armed 
groups were providing aid in areas where there was no one else, causing concern that 
their actions could garner support for the armed groups. The New York Times quoted 
Maulana Yousaf Shah, a provincial leader of Jamiat-ulema-e-Islam, as saying, “The West 
says we are terrorists and intolerant, but in time of need, we’re the ones serving the 
people.”269 The Guardian also reported that Hajji Makbool Shah, a member of Jamaat-
ud-Dawa, stated, “If the government were doing this work, there would be no need for us 
… When the floods came, we carried people out on our shoulders, to our own 
ambulances. Where were the government ambulances?”270 
5. Overall Logistical and Resource Issues 
The flooding severely damaged transportation routes and created isolated areas, 
creating a logistical challenge that was compounded by the security restrictions. Initially, 
humanitarian actors relied on the Pakistani military to move resources under the “last 
resort” principle found in the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster 
relief guidance issued by the UN.271 NGOs and the UN debated over what constituted a 
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“last resort.” The GoP asked NATO for air assistance, but after much debate over NATO 
forces’ role in the Afghan conflict, UN humanitarian agencies decided not to use NATOs 
assistance.272 
Varying assessments of the damage hindered response operations. Communities 
in need were determined by local government assessments that, at times, were based on 
political pressures. Post-incident recommendations to the IFRC and PRCS stated that 
while coordination with the local governments was advisable, validation of assessments 
should have occurred independently.273 This led to confusion over where resources were 
needed. 
6. ICRC and RCRC Society Operations 
The ICRC and the Médecins Sans Frontières refused to use the military, UN, or 
donor states’ assistance and issued reports that clearly stated they were delivering aid as 
independent entities.274 This aligned to the ICRC protocol that states: “Use of military 
assets by a component of the Movement, in particular in countries affected by armed 
conflict and/or internal strife/disturbance is a last resort solution, which can only be 
justified by serious and urgent humanitarian needs, as well as by the lack of alternative 
means.”275 The GoP did not allow civilian air assets into the northwest initially, which 
meant those NGOs that abstained from military support could not move relief supplies 
into the inaccessible areas.276 The ICRC argued that refusal to use the military, in this 
case, was to “safeguard perceptions.”277 
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The ICRC had a presence in the KP, FATA, Pakistan-administered Kashmir, 
northern Sindh, southern Punjab, and Balochistan districts, providing relief to IDPs 
before and during the flooding. During the flooding, the ICRC coordinated with the 
PRCS to ensure the delivery of funding and resources. The work done by the ICRC 
focused on the response to both the floods and the ongoing fighting. Insecurity and the 
flood response in KP and the FATA delayed livelihood support projects. The ICRC 
reported that it often had to operate via “remote management” and put procedures and 
control mechanisms in place to monitor operations.278 
An evaluation of the IFRC and PRCS response commissioned by the IFRC’s Asia 
Pacific Zonal Office found the IFRC response was affected by a lack of status agreement 
with the Pakistani government, which made it difficult to obtain visas for international 
staff and to get resources through customs. The evaluation also noted that damaged 
infrastructure, continuous movement of people, and the mass exodus of the population 
led to a breakdown of community structures that made it hard for the IFRC to conduct 
assessments.279 The evaluation found that the IFRC reached the following percentages of 
the population: 10 percent in KP, 6 percent in Punjab, and 7.8 percent in Sindh.280 
Despite being the poorest regions with the most damage, the Punjab and Sindh areas 
received less aid. The NDMA had provided a list to NGOs of all districts affected by the 
floods, identifying the severely and medium-impacted areas. The list included areas that 
were low-vulnerability and high-resilience communities mixed with high-vulnerability 
regions.281 
7. Conclusion 
The focus for this disaster is more on the use of humanitarian agencies for the 
stabilization of Pakistan. There was very low confidence in the GoP from both civilians 
and the international community to maintain security and disaster operations, 
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jeopardizing the stability of the state. The scale of the disaster, however, was the largest 
response operation and, by its sheer size, would be subject to significant issues. Given the 
complexity of the situation in Pakistan and the management of disaster response, which 
encompassed multiple armed groups with varying objectives and views of humanitarian 
agencies, it was unlikely that the distribution of aid would have been widespread.   
There were discrepancies in the ICRC and PRCS responses. The groups refused 
military support while accepting assessments—without validation—from local 
governments that were pressured by the NDMA. The approach of the ICRC and the 
PRCS focused on neutrality and independence, which varied from the cooperative 
approach they had in the 2005 earthquake, causing confusion in coordination with the 
military. This seems largely due to how the two entities viewed the response and the 
guidelines they followed. Ajay Madiwale and Kudrat Virk, in their article “Civil–Military 
Relations in Natural Disasters: A Case Study of the Pakistan Floods,” identified three 
approaches to the disaster:  
1. Those who saw themselves responding to a purely natural disaster tended 
to follow the Oslo guidelines;  
2. Those who saw themselves responding to a complex emergency, in which 
both the Pakistan national military and NATO were perceived to be parties 
to a conflict, tended to follow the [international military and civil defense 
asset (MCDA)] guidelines and to maintain an appropriate distance from 
the military where possible;  
3. Those who saw themselves responding to a natural disaster within a 
complex emergency, for which there are no international guidelines and 
where neither the Oslo guidelines nor the MCDA guidelines provide 
guidance on civil– military relations with the national military, tended to 
have varying responses to civil–military issues.282 
The ICRC approached the response per the second identified approach, which did not 
align with the view of the military. 
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F. DISASTER RESPONSE DURING CONFLICT: HISTORICAL CASES 
This section lends a historical perspective to disaster response in conflict 
situations as a point of comparison to the response efforts after the Global War on Terror 
declaration. An early example of the ICRC’s involvement—the Nigerian–Biafra, where a 
disaster occurred during the NIAC of 1967—illustrates the challenge of balancing 
political and humanitarian goals during a disaster and conflict. This response changed the 
ICRC operations and spawned the Médecins Sans Frontières due to a disagreement on 
how to handle political challenges. 
In 1967, the eastern region of the newly independent Nigeria declared itself the 
Republic of Biafra, which resulted in a civil war. The Nigerian government formed a 
blockade that stopped the transportation of food and resource supplies, eventually 
creating a famine in Biafra.283 In 1968, the ICRC began relief operations in response to 
the famine; however, it had issues obtaining consent from both the Biafran leaders and 
the Nigerian government. To meet the principle of impartiality, the ICRC insisted that 
efforts made in Biafra would be mirrored in impacted areas in Nigeria.   
The Biafran leaders accepted the concept of aid; however, they were concerned 
that the ICRC was working with the Nigerian government and was part of a military 
strategy.284 The Nigerian government insisted on final say in what would be delivered 
and how it would be delivered.285 Despite the concerns, the ICRC was eventually able to 
conduct airlifts of food into Biafra from September 1968 to the summer of 1969. The 
airlifts, however, caused an issue for the federal government. Due to the open airspace, 
gunrunners were able to use the airlifts to bring weapons into the Biafra area.286 In 1969, 
government forces shot down an aircraft that was part of the Swedish Red Cross airlift 
efforts, claiming that the plane was carrying weapons.287 The Swedish Red Cross also 
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reported that two more of its planes had been shot and hit.288 Shortly after the incident, 
the federal government took over relief operations and declared the ICRC commissioner 
general of the Nigeria–Biafra was persona non grata, temporarily ending Red Cross 
efforts.289  
This response was plagued by the issues identified by the OCHA in 2011, giving 
the impression that, despite changes made to policies, humanitarian aid agencies still face 
the same problems. In the ‘90s, shifting roles of humanitarian aid agencies and the 
increase in the number of NGOs responding in conflict led to policy changes. The UN 
formed the OCHA and the Red Cross Movement updated the Seville Agreement in 1992, 
making the ICRC the lead agency in conflicts. Changes mainly focused on the role during 
a conflict rather than a conflict/disaster incident. In 1995, the Red Cross Movement laid 
out the “Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
and NGOs in Disaster Relief,” and the “Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Disaster Relief.” 
Despite efforts to adapt to the changing environment of the ‘90s, the same issues 
continued. Another example of the barriers to humanitarian assistance identified by 
OCHA is the response to the 1998 earthquake in Afghanistan. In February of 1998, an 
earthquake occurred in the northern province of Takhar during the civil war between the 
Taliban and the Northern Alliance. In 1998, the United States had identified the Taliban 
as potential supporters of Al Qaeda, which was responsible for several bombings of U.S. 
assets. The UN had repeatedly expressed concern that the ongoing civil war would allow 
for the growth of terrorist organizations, arms, and drug trafficking that could destabilize 
the region.290 
Weather and interference by Russian border guards on the border of Tajikistan 
and the Taliban, which controlled several access points to the impacted area, hampered 
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efforts.291 A study of the UN system response to the earthquake does not mention these 
issues, but found that communication and poorly established air asset contracts were the 
cause of delays. At the time, the UN had the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU), 
which facilitated and coordinated access to and use of MCDAs in countries affected by 
humanitarian emergencies. The study stated that, “despite its wide range of contacts, the 
effectiveness and timeliness of MCDU in mobilizing military and civil defense resources 
to respond to a natural disaster in a country at war is questionable since national, political 
and security considerations take precedent and influence final government decisions.”292 
The study recommended that the UN develop stronger cooperation for joint 
actions with the ICRC/IFRC during sudden disasters. ICRC reports on the earthquake do 
not mention coordination with the Northern Alliance to provide aid in the area. There 
was, however, close coordination with the Afghan Red Crescent Society. The ICRC 
reported that, in March, the second month of the response, ICRC staff were caught in the 
inter-factional fighting.293 Buildings where ICRC staff stayed were destroyed and looted. 
The ICRC also reported insecurity and disrespect for the Red Cross emblem, forcing the 
evacuation of ICRC staff in the northern capital of Mazar-i-Sharif.  
These historical cases show that many of the same issues and barriers that existed 
in the Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan cases existed before counterterrorism laws and 
increased military humanitarian aid operations. In the case of Afghanistan, the UN study 
acknowledged that political and security issues would take precedence over humanitarian 
operations. In all five cases, this finding is evident. Even when a country has allowed for 
humanitarian aid in the conflict areas (Sri Lanka and Nigeria), once security issues arise 
the government must take precautions that result in the restriction of aid delivery. 
                                                 
291 Rohan J. Hardcastle and Adrian T. L. Chua, “Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a Right of Access 
to Victims of Natural Disasters,” International Review of the Red Cross, no. 325 (1998), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jpjd.htm. 
292 Sarah Longford, Study of the UN System-wide Response to the Earthquake in Rustaq, North-
eastern Afghanistan, 4 February 1998 (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 1998). 




The conflict between governments and armed groups affects humanitarian aid 
delivery during disaster response by creating situations that do not allow for the 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence touted by the Red Cross Movement’s code of 
conduct. The security concerns in a disaster lead to the same issues that exist in conflicts, 
as well as additional issues that compound the security concerns and can overwhelm the 
state. The three cases studies examined in this thesis show that, even if armed groups and 
governments attempt to collaborate (as they did in Sri Lanka or Indonesia with the 
ceasefire), to ensure the impartial provision of aid, there is still an insurmountable gap 
between political and humanitarian aid objectives. 
As previously mentioned, the 2012 OCHA message regarding humanitarian 
access listed five barriers to humanitarian access.294 The five barriers were present in all 
three case studies as well as the two historical cases. Counterterrorism laws did not 
appear to affect the Red Cross Movement’s response, but more typical bureaucratic 
regulations (customs laws, taxes, and inspections) restricted their resource capabilities 
due to security concerns.  
In addition to the barriers listed in the OCHA message, based on the Indonesia, 
Sri Lanka, and Pakistan case studies, there are four additional barriers to the provision of 
aid as a result of the conflict or the war on terror with armed groups: 
• multiple NGOs crowding the response 
• negative perception of humanitarian aid 
• increase of IDPs in camps that existed due to the conflict 
• impacted areas are not under state control 
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A. MULTIPLE NGOS CROWDING THE RESPONSE 
Some of the restrictions were due to security issues, but some may have been 
avoidable if there had not been hundreds of NGOs within the impacted area. The large-
scale influx of NGOs means the arrival of people and resources, which can be 
overwhelming in the chaos and can lead to delays. Despite the UN and ICRC’s role to 
coordinate NGO efforts, the amount of responding NGOs can create an untenable 
situation. Government officials have to inspect all resources coming into the country to 
avoid security risks. If NGOs were not registered in the impacted country and had not 
previously worked in that country, officials were overwhelmed with requests to process 
visas for the workers. This is a newer issue, as the historical cases in Nigeria and 
Afghanistan did not involve a multitude of NGOs on the scale of the three more recent 
cases. As seen in Afghanistan, the UN had issues coordinating with the NGOs that were 
responding to the earthquake, but not on the scale of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. 
While the influx of NGOs during the disasters was more related to the large-scale 
impact of the disaster than to the conflict, it aggravated the security situations. In the 
Pakistan and Indonesia cases, the NGOs had varying approaches to the provision of aid 
and how to interact with the military forces of the impacted country or countries 
providing military aid. This led to confusion on all sides regarding how to interact and 
coordinate efforts. In Pakistan and Indonesia, there were three different approaches to 
military assistance. This caused confusion for the military responders who were trying to 
coordinate efforts. In Indonesia, the U.S. Navy tried to work with NGOs to provide 
logistical and security assistance but struggled to deal with the lack of coordination 
among the various organizations. The Pakistani military had successfully coordinated aid 
efforts in the 2005 earthquake just to face a new scattered response five years later in the 
2010 floods. Also, multiple NGOs, to include the ICRC, developed independent 
assessments that did not coincide with UN or GoP assessments, which led to different 
approaches that did not sync with GoP efforts. 
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In Sri Lanka, the arrival of hundreds of NGOs allowed for the LTTE groups to 
pose as an NGO to take advantage of the relaxed customs laws and smuggle in weapons 
mixed with relief supplies. Although the Red Cross Movement had relationships with the 
governments in all three countries that allowed it some exceptions, it was still impacted 
by the issues caused by the large influx of NGOs. Red Cross Movement resources were 
delayed and subjected to the stricter regulations imposed for security concerns on 
resources, and delivery of relief supplies was delayed due to the glut of supplies coming 
into ports of entry.  
B. NEGATIVE PERCEPTION OF HUMANITARIAN AID 
As discussed in Chapter II, the negative perception of humanitarian aid is not 
new. However, with the war on terror, there was more concern over coordinating with the 
militaries that were involved in the response and also had a role in the conflict. The 
persistent perception that NGOs are attached to the Western Judeo–Christian agenda 
made the armed groups leery of working with the ICRC or RCRC Societies in Indonesia 
and Pakistan. The large influx of NGOs and their varying approaches to response did not 
help to dispel this perception. Some promoted their values regardless of the government’s 
request not to proselytize (this was the case in Indonesia), while others coordinated 
closely with the government and the military. 
In Indonesia, NGOs, to include the ICRC, were required to use military escorts 
outside of Aceh. The ICRC had access to areas outside of Aceh during the conflict, but 
during the disaster response was restricted from leaving Aceh. Conversely, the PMI was 
allowed to leave Aceh unescorted to provide aid. However, their chairman was also an 
advisor to the vice president of Indonesia during the response. The ICRC’s adherence to 
the restrictions and the PMI’s ties to the government, mixed with the ongoing security 
operations conducted by the TNI, could be perceived as the two entities being complicit 
in the security operations. The government already mistrusted international NGOs and 
was often responsible for fostering the negative perceptions. In Pakistan, the Red Cross 
Movement was restricted from certain areas and accepted government assessments 
without validation. This led to a biased aid effort that was not countered by the Pakistan 
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Red Crescent Society. The ICRC did counter the GoP efforts in an attempt to appear 
independent and perhaps gain acceptance by armed groups that perceived them as just 
another extension of the Western Judeo–Christian agenda. In Sri Lanka, the Red Cross 
Movement had strongly established ties due to its long-term presence during the conflict 
and did not appear to face much negative perception in that country.  
C. INCREASE OF IDPS IN EXISTING CAMPS 
All three countries had large numbers of IDPs in camps due to the conflict. When 
the disaster hit, more people took shelter in the same camps. Security for IDP camps was 
inconsistent in Sri Lanka due to reported attacks on security forces. This resulted in 
survivors reportedly being subjected to kidnappings and sexual assaults. In Indonesia, 
there were security concerns that armed groups would recruit IDPs in the camps. In 
Pakistan, IDPs displaced due to the conflict had just returned to their homes, only to turn 
around and return to the camps due to the floods. In Sri Lanka, due to the collapse of the 
P-TOMS agreement and the renewal of attacks by the LTTE and TMVP, reconstruction 
efforts were significantly slowed, leaving IDPs in camps for years. 
D. IMPACTED AREAS ARE NOT UNDER STATE CONTROL 
The government is in charge of disaster response, to include the provision of aid. 
However, if the government does not control certain parts of the impacted areas, it cannot 
readily meet the needs of civilians—that is, if the government wants to provide aid in 
those areas without the consent of the armed groups in the first place. This issue was also 
present in the historical cases, though the response did not result in planes being shot 
down by the government, as in Nigeria. Though Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan had 
relatively stable governments, armed groups controlled parts of their country.  
GAM in Indonesia had lost much ground by the time the tsunami hit, but still 
maintained some areas. In Sri Lanka, both the Northern and Eastern Provinces had proto-
governments that focused on providing aid; however, response efforts were allowed by 
the GoSL. While aid was allowed into conflict areas in Sri Lanka, it was restricted, and 
relief supplies subjected to extensive and time-consuming inspections. In the Pakistan 
case, KP and the FATA were not under GoP control. This means that the armed groups 
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were in charge of providing aid, which governments feared would allow them to gain 
more support. With the exception of Indonesia, armed groups were able to gain media 
attention, maintain the ability to attack, and receive outside financial support from groups 
considered “charitable wings” of terrorist groups. In this case, having people in IDP 
camps outside of the conflict area was beneficial, as it allowed the state to provide aid 
while choking off the armed group’s ability to “run to the rescue.” 
E. CONCLUSION 
Humanitarian aid is about bringing resources to those in need to keep them alive. 
When there are complications getting resources into the disaster-impacted area due to 
destroyed infrastructure in the conflict—and then additional complications just getting 
the resources into the country for security reasons—it creates a complex situation that can 
be challenging at best.  
Hans Morgenthau wrote, “The moral duty to spare the wounded, the sick, the 
surrendering and unarmed enemy, and to respect him as a human being who was an 
enemy only by virtue of being found on the other side of the fence, is superseded by the 
moral duty to punish and to wipe off the face of the earth the professors and practitioners 
of evil.”295 The cases studied in this thesis illustrate Morgenthau’s point. Despite 
widespread damage to infrastructure and a large loss of life in these disasters, the actions 
of the conflict only temporarily stopped. The conflict continued and hindered the 
provision of aid at the expense of the civilians that had first suffered due to the conflict 
and now had to deal with the impacts of the disaster.  
From all three case studies, it is clear that the government’s view of the situation 
can shape the response during a disaster, despite the stance of the Red Cross Movement. 
The fourth principle of Morgenthau’s theory states that political action cannot be viewed 
through the lens of universal morals, but must be based on the facts and circumstances of 
the situation.296 The Red Cross Movement’s insistence that IHL applies in disasters that 
occur during conflict is the application of a moral lens, but, interestingly, the Movement’s 
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response adjusts to the facts and circumstances of the situation. The bifurcation of the 
ICRC and RCRC Societies’ roles were of benefit to civilians in some respects, noticeably 
in Indonesia. In Sri Lanka, the ICRC’s established relationship with the GoSL was 
beneficial to both civilians in areas held by armed groups and the GoSL. When the Red 
Cross Movement insisted on adhering to its principles, the GoP stymied the Movement. 
In Pakistan, the Red Cross Movement insisted that the GoP and UN must recognize its 
principles of independence, neutrality, and impartiality, and maintained its distance from 
the military. The Movement would, however, adhere to the government assessments, 
showing some flexibility based on the situation. This structure allows for some flexibility 
to negotiate with all sides. However, the Movement is still unable to fully overcome 
political objectives to provide aid to all survivors equally. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Further research on this issue could include: 
• studying the impacts of modifying IHL and the Geneva Conventions to 
encompass the changing environment of conflict 
• developing a permanent response organization structure by function for 
NGOs responding to conflict and/or disaster 
• examining the impacts on civilians and effectiveness of multiple NGOs 
flooding into an impacted area  
• modifying the Geneva Conventions to assign the UN the ability to restrict 
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